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TAXING NUDGES
Kathleen DeLaney Thomas*
Governments are increasingly turning to behavioral economics to
inform policy design in areas like health care, the environment, and
financial decision-making. Research shows that small behavioral
interventions, referred to as “nudges,” often produce significant
responses at a low cost. The theory behind nudges is that, rather than
mandating certain behaviors or providing costly economic subsidies,
modest initiatives may “nudge” individuals to choose desirable
outcomes by appealing to their behavioral preferences. For example,
automatically enrolling workers into savings plans as a default, rather
than requiring them to actively sign up, has dramatically increased
enrollment in such plans. Similarly, allowing individuals to earn
“wellness points” from attendance at a gym, redeemable at various
retail establishments, may improve exercise habits.
A successful nudge should make a desired choice as simple and painless
as possible. Yet one source of friction may counteract an otherwise
well-designed nudge: taxation. Under current tax laws, certain
incentives designed to nudge behavior are treated as taxable income.
At best, people are ignorant of taxes on nudges, an outcome that is not
good for the tax system. At worst, taxes on nudges may actively deter
people from participating in programs with worthy policy goals. To
date, policymakers have generally failed to account for this potential
obstacle in designing nudges.
This Article sheds light on the tax treatment of nudges and the policy
implications of taxing them. It describes the emergence of a disjointed
tax regime that exempts private party nudges, but taxes identical
incentives that come from the government. What is more, an incentive
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structured as a government grant may be taxable while an economically
identical tax credit is not. The Article then proposes reforms that would
unify the tax treatment of nudges and enhance their effectiveness.
Specifically, lawmakers should reverse the default rule that all
government transfers are taxable, and instead exclude government
transfers from income unless otherwise provided by the Tax Code.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that every ten years, a flood decimates the banks of a river,
destroying homes and other buildings in its wake. Each time, the flood
causes millions of dollars of damage and leaves some people homeless or
jobless. The local government incurs enormous costs in the aftermath to
clean up damage and provide subsidies to victims.
Now imagine that experts determine that a measure can be taken to
“flood proof” homes and other buildings. The measure costs several
thousand dollars per building, but this pales in comparison to the cost of
cleaning up flood damage. Naturally, policymakers would be eager to
encourage residents along the riverbank to undertake the improvements.
But people tend to be present-biased and discount future harms, and the
residents are unmotivated to make the improvements.1 What can
policymakers do?
One option would be to mandate flood proofing and penalize those who
do not do it. But this would be politically unpopular and entail
enforcement costs. Another option would be simply to pay for the flood
proofing for each resident; but this may be cost prohibitive.
There may be a third option, however. Suppose that lawmakers decide
to offer a small carrot—a “nudge”—to encourage people to flood proof
1

See infra Subsection I.B.6.
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their homes. They might, for example, offer a modest cash reward—say
$300—for doing so. Or they might offer to provide a warranty for any
flood damage incurred after the improvement is made. The small nudge
may be enough to motivate people to flood proof their homes. If the nudge
is effective, the government might succeed in protecting its residents’
homes at a fraction of the cost of using penalties or paying for the
improvements outright.
Nudges are an increasingly popular policy tool in many contexts.
Insights from behavioral economics reveal that people’s irrational
tendencies may lead them to make suboptimal decisions, such as failing
to flood proof their homes, opting not to save for retirement, or not
applying to college. For example, people’s failure to save for retirement
is often just due to sheer inaction—what researchers call “status quo
bias,” 2 rather than any rational decision about how to spend one’s money.
Making retirement savings easier by defaulting people into savings plans
is an example of a simple nudge that achieves a desired policy at a low
cost.
The term “nudge” was famously coined by Professors Richard Thaler
and Cass Sunstein to describe an intervention that “alters people’s
behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or
significantly changing their economic incentives.”3 Nudges might make
a desired choice easier or simpler for people, they might help people
overcome bad habits like procrastination, or they may simply provide
people with better information.4 Governments around the world have
increasingly used nudges to enact cost-effective policies to improve the
welfare of their citizens.
Nudges come in many forms: shifting defaults, like in the case of
savings plans; sending people text message reminders to apply for college
financial aid; or simplifying instructions on forms. Other nudges provide
small incentives, like cash rewards or “wellness points” one might earn
for achieving health goals. Regardless of the form of a particular nudge,
it should make a desired choice as simple and painless as possible.
Yet one source of friction may counteract an otherwise well-designed
nudge: taxation.
2

See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health,
Wealth, and Happiness 6 (2d ed. 2009).
4
Cass R. Sunstein, Misconceptions About Nudges, 2 J. Behav. Econ. for Pol’y 61, 61
(2018).
3
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Under current tax laws, certain incentives aimed at nudging behavior
are treated as taxable income. While nudges like defaults or text message
reminders do not have tax consequences, nudges that provide an
economic benefit to the recipient may be taxable. This is true regardless
of whether the benefit comes in the form of cash, property, or services.
For example, if a local government offers its citizens a $300 reward for
flood proofing their homes, that grant would be subject to federal income
taxation.
At best, people are ignorant of taxes on nudges, an outcome that is not
good for the tax system. It may be particularly counterintuitive to people
that government grants would be subject to tax. At worst, taxes on nudges
may actively deter people from participating in programs with worthy
policy goals. For example, homeowners may decide to forego a cash
reward for flood proofing their home because they do not want to deal
with the hassle of reporting it or because they do not want to attract
scrutiny from the IRS. To date, policymakers have generally failed to
account for this potential obstacle in designing nudges.
This Article sheds light on the tax treatment of nudges and the policy
implications of taxing them. It first describes the emergence of a
disjointed tax regime that often exempts nudges that come from private
parties, but taxes identical incentives that come from the government. As
a default, the tax law generally treats all economic benefits as taxable
income. However, broad exceptions exist for certain incentives provided
by employers to their employees, which are often classified as nontaxable
fringe benefits. Similarly, incentives paid by nonprofits to individuals are
likely to be treated as nontaxable gifts. Nudges provided by businesses to
paying customers are also exempt from tax under the judicially created
“purchase price adjustment” doctrine.
When it comes to identical incentives provided by governments,
however, none of the fringe benefit, gift, or purchase price adjustment
exclusions apply. Furthermore, while many government transfers are
exempt from tax under other exclusions—for example, welfare
assistance, veterans’ benefits, Social Security, and Medicare—those rules
do not cover most nudges. Without a special exclusion, incentive-based
nudges provided by governments are generally subject to tax under
current laws. This regime does not appear to be a product of design, but
is more likely the result of a piecemeal system of tax exemptions that has
developed over time. Perhaps even more confounding is that an incentive
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structured as a government grant may be taxable, while an economically
identical tax credit is not.
After examining the tax treatment of the most common types of
nudges, this Article proposes reforms that would unify the tax treatment
of nudges and enhance their effectiveness. It argues that lawmakers
should reverse the default rule that all government transfers are taxable,
and instead provide a rule that government transfers are excluded from
income unless otherwise provided by the Tax Code. This would ensure
that nudges designed to promote worthy policy goals would be exempt
from tax as a default matter, unless Congress specifically decides
otherwise. As an alternative to this broad proposal, the Article also
proposes legislation that would exempt specific nudges from tax in the
areas of health and environmental protection. Under either approach,
exempting nudges from tax will make them more effective and should not
pose serious revenue consequences.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the concept of a
nudge and categorizes the most common types of nudges. Part II provides
an overview of the tax system and discusses the current tax treatment of
nudges. Part III discusses policy implications of the current tax regime,
including proposals to reform the tax treatment of nudges. Part IV
concludes that the simplest, yet most effective, way to unify the tax
treatment of nudges would be for Congress to provide a default of
nontaxability for government transfers.
I. BACKGROUND ON NUDGES
This Part describes the concept of a “nudge” in more detail and
discusses the most common types of nudges.
A. What are Nudges?
Policymakers may wish to change the behavior of citizens for myriad
reasons. For example, people may make poor health choices that impose
costs on the health care system, or they may engage in activities that
damage the environment. When seeking to modify behavior, the classic
tools from economics are penalties and subsidies.5 An example of the
former would be a statute that bans littering and imposes a fine for
5

See, e.g., George Loewenstein & Nick Chater, Putting Nudges in Perspective, 1 Behav.
Pub. Pol’y. 26, 29 (2017) (“Traditional economic interventions include taxes, subsidies and
mandatory disclosure of information . . . .”).
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violations; an example of the latter would be a tax credit for driving a
fuel-efficient car. The effectiveness of penalties and subsidies varies by
context.6 In general, however, these measures can impose significant
costs on governments. Subsidies must be paid for and result in direct
revenue loss, while fines may impose indirect costs such as increased
enforcement and the potential “crowding-out” of voluntary compliance.7
In recent years, insights from behavioral economics have suggested a
third alternative to penalties and subsidies.8 As researchers learn more
about human behavior and how people make judgments, they have
observed that sometimes a “gentle hint”9 or “nudge” can have as much
influence on behavior as a mandate or a financial subsidy can.10
As an illustration, consider what is perhaps the best-known and widely
praised policy nudge to date: automatic enrollment in savings plans.11
Researchers, and eventually lawmakers, set out to increase enrollment in
workplace savings plans like a 401(k). Rather than requiring workers to
sign up for a plan and decide how much to contribute (i.e., a default of no
enrollment), the default was shifted to automatic enrollment in a savings
plan.12 Under the new default, unless workers opt out of the plan or alter
their rate of contribution, they will automatically start saving.13 The
simple act of shifting this default dramatically increased enrollments in
savings plans.14 It appears the default election helps people overcome
“status quo bias,” that is, the human tendency to avoid change.15
6

See, e.g., David Halpern, Inside the Nudge Unit: How Small Changes Can Make a Big
Difference 4 (2015).
7
See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues, 107 Econ.
J. 1043, 1044–45 (1997).
8
Cass R. Sunstein, Nudging: A Very Short Guide, 37 J. Consumer Pol’y 583, 583 (2014)
(Nudges “generally cost little and have the potential to promote economic and other
goals . . . .”).
9
Halpern, supra note 6, at 22.
10
Brian Galle argues that, in some circumstances, nudges are the most efficient choice of
instrument. See Brian Galle, The Problem of Intrapersonal Cost, 18 Yale J. Health Pol’y, L.,
& Ethics 1, 32–50 (2018).
11
Sunstein, supra note 8, at 585. However, for a critique of savings defaults, see Ryan Bubb
& Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 Harv. L. Rev.
1593, 1607–37 (2014).
12
Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 110–11.
13
Id. at 111.
14
See, e.g., id. at 111–13 (automatic enrollment increased employee participation in savings
plans from 65% to 90%, and could notably increase per-capita contribution percentages);
Loewenstein & Chater, supra note 5, at 27.
15
Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect,
Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 193, 197–98 (1991).
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Governments have increasingly adopted nudges as cost-effective ways
to promote public policy. The Obama Administration created a “Social
and Behavioral Sciences Team,” (“SBST”) which conducted over thirty
pilot programs that applied behavioral insights to government policy.16
For example, the SBST partnered with the Department of Education’s
office of Federal Student Aid (“FSA”) to send a series of low-cost,
personalized text messages to low-income students to remind of them of
the steps needed to complete the college application process.17 This
simple intervention resulted in a 5.7 percentage point increase in overall
college enrollment.18
The United Kingdom has adopted behavioral economics into
government policy even more extensively, establishing a Behavioral
Insights Team in 2010 (also known as the “Nudge Unit”) that has
conducted hundreds of studies to date.19 Among many successful
interventions, the UK’s Nudge Unit has increased payment of local taxes
through appeals to social norms, reduced prescription medication errors
by redesigning prescription forms, and increased voter registration rates
through the use of a lottery.20
Many other countries, including Germany, Canada, Australia,
Denmark, France, and the Netherlands, have also adopted their own
version of a nudge unit.21 Although not all behaviorally informed

16

See About SBST, SBST, https://sbst.gov/#report [https://perma.cc/S3YM-35MC] (last
visited June 14, 2019).
17
William J. Congdon & Maya Shankar, The White House Social & Behavioral Sciences
Team: Lessons Learned from Year One, 1 Behav. Sci. & Pol’y 77, 83 (2015),
https://behavioralpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/BSP_vol1is2_Congdon.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EXF9-RWMV].
18
Id.
19
See About Us, Behavioural Insights Team, https://www.bi.team/about-us/
[https://perma.cc/6BUF-95PA] (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (“We have run more than 750
projects to date, including 400 randomised controlled trials in dozens of countries.”).
20
See Christopher Larkin, Michael Sanders, Isabelle Andresen & Felicity Algate, Testing
Local Descriptive Norms and Salience of Enforcement Action: A Field Experiment to Increase
Tax Collection, 2 J. Behav. Pub. Admin. 1, 9–10 (2019); Dominic King et al., Redesigning
the “Choice Architecture” of Hospital Prescription Charts: A Mixed Methods Study
Incorporating In Situ Simulation Testing, 4 BMJ Open 1, 8–9 (2014); Peter John, Elizabeth
MacDonald & Michael Sanders, Targeting Voter Registration with Incentives: A Randomized
Controlled Trial of a Lottery in a London Borough, 40 Electoral Stud. 170, 175 (2015).
21
See Zeina Afif, William Wade Islan, Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez & Abigail Goodnow Dalton,
World Bank Group, Behavioral Science Around the World: Profiles of 10 Countries 6 (2019),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/710771543609067500/pdf/132610-REVISED00-COUNTRY-PROFILES-dig.pdf [https://perma.cc/JDX2-R9UK].
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interventions have been successful,22 governments continue to
experiment with ways to incorporate behavioral economics into policy
design.23
B. Types of Nudges
This Section surveys research on various types of nudges and provides
examples of specific behavioral interventions. The discussion also groups
nudges together into different categories. As will be discussed further in
Part II, some types of nudges have tax implications and others do not, and
grouping various behavioral interventions into categories will assist with
that analysis. These categories, which are by no means exhaustive,
include nudges based on defaults, simplification, appeals to social norms,
information, and incentives.
This Article uses the term “nudge” broadly to include any intervention
that does not rely on traditional economic incentives. Other commentators
may define nudge more narrowly. Furthermore, as discussed below, the
line between what constitutes a nudge and what constitutes a subsidy may
sometimes be hard to draw, and some incentives involve a mix of
economic and non-economic considerations. Importantly, these
definitional issues do not have tax implications and do not impact the
analysis herein. In other words, if an incentive is taxable, it is taxable
regardless of whether it is properly characterized as a nudge or a subsidy.
1. Defaults
For a variety of psychological reasons—procrastination, present bias,
and the power of inertia—defaults are powerful drivers of human
choice.24 The simple act of shifting defaults to desired outcomes, while
preserving the choice to opt out of the default, has had a significant policy
impact, as demonstrated in the case of retirement savings discussed
above. Defaults have been employed as nudges in numerous other settings
as well. For example, changing default settings to double-sided printing
reduces paper consumption,25 and requiring people to opt out of organ
22

See, e.g., Congdon & Shankar, supra note 17, at 84 (finding that letters sent to physicians
comparing their prescribing rates with those of their peers had no measurable impact on
prescription rates).
23
See Afif et al., supra note 21, at 8–9.
24
See, e.g., Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 12, 85.
25
See, e.g., Johan Egebark & Mathias Ekström, Can Indifference Make the World Greener?
11–13 (Rsch. Inst. of Indus. Econ., IFN Working Paper No. 975, 2013).
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donation drastically increases the participation rate compared to an opt-in
system.26
2. Simplification
Reducing the cognitive burden of decision making also appears to help
people make better choices. Oftentimes, complexity may stand as a
barrier to participating in government programs that are otherwise in
peoples’ financial interest.27 With this in mind, some nudges are designed
to simplify existing forms or processes.
One experiment examined the impact of simplification of the Free
Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), which is an eight-page
form with over 100 questions, necessary for students that want financial
aid to attend college.28 As compared to individuals who did not receive
assistance, a treatment group that received a simplified version of the
form, prepopulated with tax return information, was significantly more
likely to submit the aid application.29
3. Information
Related to simplification is the idea that providing people with more
information, or information that is easier to access and understand, can
also improve decisions. Some nudges involve better disclosure. For
example, after finding that car consumers are not good at understanding
how fuel economy relates to cost, the Environmental Protection Agency
and Department of Transportation required new disclosures from car
manufacturers, to better inform people.30 The revised disclosure label
clearly states the projected annual fuel cost, as well as the projected fiveyear savings or costs of the car compared to the average new car.31
Other nudges relate to the timing of information. For example, sending
text message reminders to people shortly before they are scheduled to
26

Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives? 302 Science 1338, 1338–
39 (2003).
27
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 8, at 585.
28
Eric P. Bettinger, Bridget Terry Long, Philip Oreopoulos & Lisa Sanbonmatsu, The Role
of Simplification and Information in College Decisions: Results from the H&R Block FAFSA
Experiment 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 15361, 2009),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w15361.pdf [https://perma.cc/XBV6-DL2U].
29
Id. at 26–27.
30
Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1349, 1372–73
(2011).
31
Id. at 1373.

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2021]

Taxing Nudges

581

appear in court significantly reduces the number of people who fail to
appear, thereby reducing warrants.32 Similarly, a reminder email sent to
federal student loan borrowers who missed their first student loan
payment increased the percentage of people making a payment.33
Other informational nudges rely on salience, the idea that people may
respond differently to a message depending on how visible or noticeable
it is.34 One example is the innovation of signing at the top for selfreporting on forms. Researchers found that moving the signature line from
the bottom of a form to the top, i.e., asking people to sign to verify the
form’s accuracy before they fill it out rather than after, leads to more
honest reporting.35 The theory behind the nudge is that asking people to
sign the form at the beginning makes the ethical component of the
signature more salient, and leads people to consider ethical obligations as
they fill out the form.36
Governments also frequently rely on salience when it comes to warning
labels. Cigarette labels, for example, are often designed with highly
salient language and graphics, in an attempt to more successfully
influence consumers.37
4. Appeals to Social Norms
Appealing to social norms—the idea that people are influenced by what
others around them are doing—is also a successful nudge in some
contexts. The UK’s Nudge Unit improved tax compliance by sending

32
See, e.g., New Text Message Reminders for Summons Recipients Improves Attendance
in Court and Dramatically Cuts Warrants, Ideas42, https://www.ideas42.org/new-textmessage-reminders-summons-recipients-improves-attendance-court-dramatically-cutswarrants/ [https://perma.cc/5SMM-PPFH] (last visited June. 17, 2019) (finding that text
message reminders in New York City reduced “failure to appear” rates by 26%).
33
See Congdon & Shankar, supra note 17, at 83.
34
See, e.g., Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and
Evidence, 99 Am. Econ. Rev. 1145, 1165 (2009).
35
Lisa L. Shu, Nina Mazar, Francesca Gino, Dan Ariely & Max H. Bazerman, Signing at
the Beginning Makes Ethics Salient and Decreases Dishonest Self-Reports in Comparison to
Signing at the End, 109 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 15197, 15197–98 (2012),
http://www.pnas.org/content/109/38/15197.full.pdf+html [https://perma.cc/436E-DGL2]
36
Id. at 15198.
37
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 30, at 1381; Kate Phillips, Applying Behavioral Science
Upstream in the Policy Design Process, Behav. Scientist (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://behavioralscientist.org/applying-behavioral-science-upstream-in-the-policy-designprocess/ [https://perma.cc/UWJ5-BBC7] (describing new laws implemented in Australia,
requiring graphic images on cigarette labels, to reduce smoking rates).
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people letters informing them that most citizens pay their taxes on time.38
Similarly, informing people how their energy usage compares to that of
their neighbors appears to have a positive impact: consumers reduced
their energy usage when they were informed theirs was higher than
average.39
5. Incentives
Traditional economic incentives are, by definition, not nudges.40 For
example, imagine it would cost an individual $10,000 to install solar
panels on her house. Further imagine that the benefit of the panels,
including the value added to her home and the energy cost savings during
the time she is expected to live in the home, is worth $8000. Without a
subsidy, the homeowner will not want to spend $10,000 for an $8000
benefit, and thus she will not install the panels. But if the government
offers her a $3000 tax credit for installation of the panels, making the net
cost only $7000, she may decide to install the panels. 41 In this case, the
individual was not nudged to install the solar panels, she was simply
responding to a financial incentive to do so.
Notwithstanding the fact that traditionally defined nudges “must not
impose significant material incentives,”42 many nudges do provide some
form of incentive. Often the incentive comes in the form of property (e.g.,
a prize) or services. Other nudges may provide small cash incentives,
sometimes referred to as “micro-incentives.”43 Generally, what
distinguishes a small cash incentive from an economic subsidy is that,
with the former, the response is driven by some psychological
38
Michael Hallsworth, John A. List, Robert D. Metcalfe & Ivo Vlaev, The Behavioralist as
Tax Collector: Using Natural Field Experiments to Enhance Tax Compliance 4 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20007, 2014), https://www.nber.org/papers/w20007
[https://perma.cc/W7LN-F2T2].
39
Hunt Allcott, Social Norms and Energy Conservation, 95 J. Pub. Econ. 1082, 1082–83
(2011).
40
Sunstein, supra note 4, at 61 (distinguishing between nudges, which “must preserve
freedom of choice,” and subsidies or other interventions, which “impose[] significant material
costs on choosers”).
41
This is assuming economically rational decision making on behalf of the homeowner,
without factoring in other (realistic) costs, such as hassle costs and present bias.
42
Sunstein, supra note 4, at 61.
43
See Robert Münscher, Max Vetter & Thomas Scheuerle, A Review and Taxonomy of
Choice Architecture Techniques, 29 J. Behav. Decision Making 511, 518 (2016) (defining
micro-incentives as “changes of the consequences of decision options that are insignificant
from a rational choice perspective”).
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phenomenon, rather than a rational cost-benefit analysis.44 For example,
imagine that a $5 cash payment encouraged people to get a free flu
vaccine. The payment might work because it is salient and immediate, but
it is less likely that $5 acts as a true economic subsidy, as compared to the
above example of the solar panels.45
a. Health
Incentive-based nudges are frequently employed in the context of
improving health decisions.46 One common example is workplace
wellness programs, which are offered by about half of employers in the
United States.47 The theory behind the programs is that by providing
employees with incentives to make healthy lifestyle choices, like proper
diet and exercise, they will be more productive and impose fewer
healthcare costs.48
Wellness plans come in a range of sizes and forms, with the most
comprehensive plans offered by large companies providing medical
personnel onsite.49 More commonly, employer wellness plans offer a
range of screenings and incentives to keep employees active and healthy.
44

Id.
The small size of the payment makes it particularly less likely to function as a true subsidy,
although it could. For example, if paying for bus fare to a local clinic was the impediment to
a person obtaining a free flu shot, the $5 may operate as an economic subsidy free of
behavioral considerations. For further discussion of the distinction between nudges and
subsidies, see Brian Galle, Tax, Command . . . or Nudge?: Evaluating the New Regulation, 92
Tex. L. Rev. 837, 854–56 (2014) (explaining that “surprising and asymmetric incentives” are
one factor distinguishing nudges from subsidies, and using a five-cent tax on plastic bags as
an example of a financial consequence that is most likely a nudge, given that alternatives are
generally more costly than the bag tax).
46
Bronwyn McGill, Blythe J. O’Hara, Anne C. Grunseit & Philayrath Phongsavan, Are
Financial Incentives for Lifestyle Behavior Change Informed or Inspired by Behavioral
Economics? A Mapping Review, 33 Am. J. Health Promotion 131, 131 (2019) (“Since the
1960s, financial incentives (FIs) have been used in behavior change interventions, targeting a
broad spectrum of health issues such as blood donation, medication adherence, and health and
wellness programs.”).
47
Soeren Mattke et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Study: Final Report, at xiv (Rand
Corp. ed. 2013); see also Laura A Linnan, Laurie Cluff, Jason E. Lang, Michael Penne &
Maija S. Leff, Results of the Workplace Health in America Survey, 3 Am. J. Health Promotion
652, 655 (2019) (over 46% of worksites surveyed had wellness programs).
48
See Ha T. Tu & Ralph C. Mayrell, Employer Wellness Initiatives Grow, But Effectiveness
Varies Widely, Nat’l Inst. for Health Care Reform, July 2010, at 2 (concluding that employers
offer wellness programs to contain medical costs, to improve productivity, and to “position
themselves as ‘employers of choice’”).
49
Id.
45
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For example, many plans offer free health risk assessments and biometric
screenings, like cholesterol or blood pressure tests.50 Some plans offered
by large employers also offer free services to employees in the form of
health coaching, smoking cessation programs, or weight loss programs.51
For example, some employers offer free Weight Watchers meetings
onsite.52 Others may offer reduced or free gym memberships, or onsite
fitness facilities.53 Health related seminars and other educational
programs are also routine offerings.54
Financial incentives are also a common feature of wellness plans,55
with 84% of employers who offer plans offering rewards of some kind.56
One common financial incentive is a reduction or reimbursement of
insurance premiums, offered in exchange for participation in wellness
initiatives.57 Other programs offer cash rewards;58 for example, an
employee might be paid a certain dollar amount for every percentage of
body weight lost.59 Employers also frequently offer non-cash rewards,
like gift certificates or other novelty items (e.g., a T-shirt), to participating
employees.60

50

Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3–4.
52
Mattke et al., supra note 47, at xv.
53
Tu & Mayrell, supra note 48, at 5; Bahaudin G. Mujtaba & Frank J. Cavico, Corporate
Wellness Programs: Implementation Challenges in the Modern American Workplace, 1 Int’l
J. Health Pol’y & Mgmt. 193, 194 (2013) (mentioning gym reimbursements as a part of
corporate wellness programs).
54
See, e.g., Mujtaba & Cavico, supra note 53, at 194 (listing seminars as a part of corporate
wellness programs).
55
These wellness program incentives are regulated by several laws. For example, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) imposes multiple nondiscrimination
requirements. See Tu & Mayrell, supra note 48, at 6.
56
Mattke et al., supra note 47, at 73 fig.5.3.
57
Tu & Mayrell, supra note 48, at 5; see also Mujtaba & Cavico, supra note 53, at 196
(referencing “[h]ealth insurance discounts and reimbursements for employees who meet
health standards and maintain a healthy lifestyle”).
58
One report found that “[m]ost benefits consultants and wellness vendors believed that
$100 is the ‘sweet spot’ for an incentive for a ‘single instance of behavior,’ such as HRA
completion or participation in a specific wellness activity.” See Tu & Mayrell, supra note 48,
at 5.
59
John Cawley & Joshua A. Price, A Case Study of a Workplace Wellness Program That
Offers Financial Incentives for Weight Loss, 32 J. Health Econ. 794, 795 (2013).
60
Mattke et al., supra note 47, at xxi.
51
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Even in the case of cash incentives, these programs often act more like
nudges than subsidies.61 In the case of weight loss, for example, present
bias62 may prevent people from attaining their goals.63 Cash rewards may
help people overcome these psychological obstacles because such
rewards are salient and immediate, while weight loss itself is not.64
Finally, it should be noted that some wellness plan strategies are not
incentives at all, but rather resemble the other types of nudges described
above. For example, some employers have undertaken measures like
moving parking lots farther from the building or improving stairwells to
encourage more walking.65 Another common workplace nudge is
replacing food in the vending machines and/or cafeteria with healthier
choices.66
Incentive-based nudges to promote health extend beyond workplace
wellness programs, as well. For example, hospitals in the United States
and Canada have recently experimented with rewarding substance
abusers when they stay clean.67 One program in British Columbia offers
an eight-week program, during which time participants can pull a chip out
of a hat once a week if their drug test is negative.68 The chips are worth
5, 20, or 100 Canadian dollars, and are redeemed for prizes like gift cards
at local restaurants or stores.69 A similar program at Veteran’s Affairs
hospitals in the United States runs for twelve weeks and allows

61

But see Katherine Pratt, A Constructive Critique of Public Health Arguments for AntiObesity Soda Taxes and Food Taxes, 87 Tul. L. Rev. 73, 77–94 (2012) (discussing economic,
externality-based justifications for anti-obesity taxes and subsidies).
62
Present bias describes the tendency to value immediate rewards over future rewards, even
if the future rewards are larger. See, e.g., Richard Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on
Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 Econ. Letters 201, 201 (1981). In the context of weight loss, it is
hard for people to forego immediate benefits (a tasty meal, for example) in exchange for a
future benefit (lower weight).
63
See Cawley & Price, supra note 59, at 794 (“[P]eople may want to do what is in their
long-run interest (lose weight), but consistently succumb to the temptation to eat and be
sedentary.”).
64
Id.
65
Tu & Mayrell, supra note 48, at 5.
66
Id.
67
Sahil Gupta, Opinion, Earning Prizes for Fighting an Addiction, N.Y. Times (Mar. 12,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/opinion/earning-prizes-for-fighting-anaddiction.html [https://perma.cc/58CN-DT45].
68
Id.
69
Id.
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participants the opportunity to draw chips in exchange for a clean test
twice a week.70
In the context of smoking cessation, research suggests cash-based
incentives may be both particularly effective and preferable to other
interventions. One study compared both group and individual cessation
interventions and found that offering participants cash—a total of $800 if
they quit for at least 6 months—was the most effective way to encourage
quitting.71 Other studies have shown similarly positive results,72 and some
researchers have suggested that Medicaid pay smokers who are willing to
quit.73
Some cities in the United States have also implemented programs that
pay young women to avoid teen pregnancy.74 For example, a North
Carolina program called “College Bound Sisters” paid women ages
twelve to eighteen a dollar a day (paid as seven dollars per week) for every
week they did not get pregnant.75 The money was deposited into a fund
and became collectable only when they enrolled in college.76 Planned
Parenthood in Denver, Colorado sponsored a similar program in the late
1980s.77

70

Id.
Scott D. Halpern et al., Randomized Trial of Four Financial-Incentive Programs for
Smoking Cessation, 372 N. Eng. J. Med. 2108, 2108 (2015). Another intervention explored in
the study was a deposit program in which participants would put up their own funds and earn
them back if they successfully quit. Although the deposit was very effective for those who
chose it, the cash incentive was more successful overall at reducing smoking, because
significantly more participants opted for the cash intervention over the deposit. Id. at 2114.
72
See, e.g., Kevin G. Volpp et al., A Randomized, Controlled Trial of Financial Incentives
for Smoking Cessation, 360 New Eng. J. Med. 699, 707 (2009) (finding that a group who
received financial incentives to refrain from smoking had “significantly higher” rates of
“prolonged abstinence” than did a control group, who did not receive the same incentives).
73
See, e.g., Jody Sindelar, Opinion, Should We Pay People to Stop Smoking?, CNN (Oct.
5, 2011), https://www.cnn.com/2011/10/05/opinion/sindelar-smoking-medicaid/index.html
[https://perma.cc/C3Y6-39H8].
74
Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 236.
75
Joshua Rhett Miller, North Carolina Program Pays Girls a Dollar a Day Not to Get
Pregnant, Fox News (June 25, 2009), https://www.foxnews.com/story/north-carolinaprogram-pays-girls-a-dollar-a-day-not-to-get-pregnant [https://perma.cc/L6JJ-7CVW]. The
payment was contingent on attending a ninety-minute lesson each week, where the women
learned about abstinence and contraception use. Id.
76
Id.
77
Dyan Zaslowsky, Denver Program Curbs Teen-Agers’ Pregnancy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16,
1989, at A8.
71
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b. Environment
Another common context for incentive-based nudges is environmental
protection. Although traditional regulation in the form of subsidies and
penalties is also common in this area,78 researchers have noted that
behavioral biases underlie many environmental challenges, like
addressing climate change.79 For example, researchers have observed that
individuals underinvest in energy-efficient appliances, even when there
would be cost savings from purchasing them, because of their tendency
to discount future benefits.80 Recognizing that behavioral economics
provides additional insights into how to encourage people to make
environmentally friendly choices, a number of “green nudges”81 have
been developed in the past several decades.
As in the case of health-related nudges, not all green nudges involve
incentives, and many incorporate other types of nudges like defaults,
simplification, or appeals to social norms. For example, some utility
companies may default customers into renewable energy sources while
allowing them to opt out, thereby increasing the number of consumers
who use green energy.82 And as discussed above, letters appealing to
social norms are common tools to reduce energy consumption.
In several other environmental contexts, researchers and governments
have offered nudges that are incentives. Recognizing that individuals
underinvest in energy-efficient technology despite substantial cost
savings,83 many utility producers offer free or subsidized products. For
example, Duke Energy Company offers customers in some states free
LED light bulbs, which burn more efficiently than standard bulbs and
78
Economic Incentives, Environmental Protection Agency, https://www.epa.gov/
environmental-economics/economic-incentives [https://perma.cc/UCT5-4JJB] (last visited
Dec. 21, 2020) (explaining that market-based incentives, like taxes and subsidies, are
“becoming increasingly popular as tools for addressing a wide range of environmental
issues”).
79
Christian Schubert, Green Nudges: Do They Work? Are They Ethical?, 132 Ecological
Econ. 329, 329 (2017).
80
See Howard Kunreuther & Elke U. Weber, Aiding Decision Making to Reduce the
Impacts of Climate Change, 37 J. Consumer Pol’y 397, 397–98 (2014).
81
See, e.g., Schubert, supra note 79, at 330 (defining green nudges as “nudges that aim at
promoting environmentally benign behavior”).
82
Id.
83
See Hunt Allcott & Dmitry Taubinsky, Evaluating Behaviorally Motivated Policy:
Experimental Evidence from the Lightbulb Market, 105 Am. Econ. Rev. 2501, 2501–02
(2015) (exploring the phenomenon and finding that moderate subsidies for energy-efficient
lightbulbs may be effective in addressing this underinvestment).
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reduce energy costs.84 The company also offers substantial rebates on the
purchase and installation of energy efficient appliances.85 Customers that
replace an old HVAC system with a more energy-efficient one can earn a
$400 payment for installing a geothermal heat pump and an extra $50 for
installing a smart thermostat.86 Customers can also earn $250 for sealing
their attics and an additional $100 for ductwork repair.87
Researchers in Japan experimented with a nudge approach to
encourage homeowners to undertake home improvements that would
mitigate future earthquake damage, a process known as seismic
retrofitting.88 Past experience in Japan showed that it is hard to motivate
individuals to incur the costs of such home improvements, even if it is
ultimately in their financial interest due to expected future harms.89 To
encourage seismic retrofitting in the study, survey respondents were
presented with the option of a free warranty with their retrofitting that
would cover the entire cost of repair if a retrofitted house were damaged
in an earthquake.90 The theory behind the nudge was that consumers
generally overvalue warranties offered with products (e.g., a warranty
offered for purchase with a new television), so a warranty might serve as
a good motivation to undertake the seismic retrofitting improvements.91
The study confirmed that, indeed, individuals were more willing to
improve their home when nudged with a warranty offer.92

84
Free LED Program, Duke Energy, https://www.duke-energy.com/home/products/freeleds [https://perma.cc/FY93-D5L5] (last visited June 19, 2019); see also Commercial Retrofit,
Puget Sound Energy, https://www.pse.com/rebates/business-incentives/commercial-retrofitgrants [https://perma.cc/R578-FS72] (last visited July 5, 2019) (providing coverage for up to
70% of the cost for energy efficient upgrades).
85
Smart $aver: Home Improvement Rebate Program, Duke Energy, https://www.dukeenergy.com/home/products/smart-saver [https://perma.cc/GAT6-GC5L] (last visited June 19,
2019).
86
HVAC Install, Duke Energy, https://www.duke-energy.com/home/products/smartsaver/hvac-install [https://perma.cc/BE7P-YTJQ] (last visited June 19, 2019).
87
Insulate & Seal, Duke Energy, https://www.duke-energy.com/home/products/smartsaver/insulate-and-seal [https://perma.cc/RC5K-V89W] (last visited June 19, 2019).
88
Toshio Fujimi & Hirokazu Tatano, Promoting Seismic Retrofit Implementation Through
“Nudge”: Using Warranty as a Driver, 33 Risk Analysis 1858, 1873 (2013).
89
See id. at 1859–60.
90
Id. at 1863.
91
Id. at 1859.
92
Id. at 1873.
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6. Beyond Nudges: Behaviorally Based Subsidies
Imagine that the government offers individuals a cash payment of
$1,000 to reward a desired behavior. Is that a nudge or a subsidy? In the
case of incentives, it may be impossible to draw a line between what
constitutes an immaterially small cash incentive (a nudge) and a true
economic subsidy. But identifying a dollar threshold separating nudges
and subsidies is not necessary for purposes of this discussion. Some
payments are too large to technically qualify as “nudges,” yet their
effectiveness may still be explained by behavioral, rather than purely
economic, considerations. This Article refers to such payments as
“behaviorally based subsidies” (“BBS”).
Consider again the example of the individual who faces a cost of
$10,000 to install solar panels and values the improvement at only $8,000.
If people always made economically rational decisions, then offering the
individual a $3,000 tax credit should incentivize her to install the panels.
Her total installation cost, after factoring in the credit, would be $7,000,
while the benefit would be $8,000, resulting in a net gain of $1,000 from
the transaction.
In reality, however, we know that individuals do not always behave
rationally. Imagine that the individual is confronting the decision whether
to install the panels in June of 2019. To do the work in the summer, she
may have to pay for the panels by August. The tax credit would be
claimed on her 2019 return, which she could not file until 2020. This
scenario creates several psychological obstacles to installing the panels.
First, individuals are present-biased and tend to discount future
payments.93 This means that spending $10,000 now and receiving a $3000
credit next year might not “feel” like a net cost of $7000, but might instead
be experienced as a $10,000 loss. Second, how the individual responds to
the tax credit might depend on her overall tax payment position. If she is
already owed a refund when she files her tax return, and the tax credit
results in $3,000 of additional refunded money, she is more likely to
experience the credit as a windfall.94 On the other hand, if the $3,000
credit simply reduces the taxes she owes, the credit will be less salient,
and she may value it less.95

93

See supra note 62.
See Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, The Modern Case for Withholding, 53 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 81, 124 (2019).
95
See id. at 114.
94
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As the example illustrates, there are many behavioral considerations
when structuring incentives. Consumers may need to be paid upfront to
be sufficiently motivated to change their behavior. Or in some contexts,
consumers may respond better to cash than to other forms of incentives.
In the case of the solar panels, an upfront cash grant may function as a
BBS because an economically equivalent tax credit, paid months after the
fact, may not be effective. In reality, a combination of both behavioral
and economic considerations likely contributes to the effectiveness of
many incentives.96
Turning to real-world examples, policymakers have increasingly
recognized the need to structure traditional economic incentives
according to behavioral preferences. Going back to the case of seismic
retrofitting, where individuals are frequently unmotivated to improve
their homes even when it will save them money, some governments have
offered cash grants. Some cities in Japan have offered cash subsidies as
high as 1.5 million yen97 (nearly 14,000 U.S. dollars). In earthquakeprone regions of California, homeowners may apply for a cash grant of
$3,000 to retrofit their homes to prevent future damage.98 These grants
are likely motivated by a combination of factors, including making it
more affordable for individuals to improve their homes (economic
subsidy) and providing individuals with an immediate, salient cash
reward for doing so (behavioral).
The distinction between nudge and subsidy generally has no bearing
on whether an incentive is taxable, as discussed further in Part II. Further,
the obstacles posed by taxing incentives—deterring participation in
programs with worthy policy goals, for example—will often exist
regardless of whether the incentive is a nudge or a subsidy. Accordingly,
the remainder of the Article discusses nudges and BBS on a collective
basis.
II. TAX TREATMENT OF NUDGES
This Part overviews the basic federal income tax rules and then turns
to the tax treatment of nudges and BBS.

96

See Loewenstein & Chater, supra note 5, at 29–30.
See Fujimi & Tatano, supra note 88, at 1872.
98
Earthquake Brace + Bolt, https://www.earthquakebracebolt.com [https://perma.cc/
5WPS-7X73] (last visited June 20, 2019).
97
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A. Overview of Basic Income Tax Principles
1. Defining Income
The starting point for deciding whether a nudge is taxable is
determining whether it constitutes “gross income” for federal income tax
purposes.99 Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) defines
gross income as “all income from whatever source derived.”100 The
definition sounds circular, but it creates a powerful default rule: anything
that would be considered “income” from an economic perspective is
income for tax purposes, regardless of where it came from. In other words,
unless the Code specifically excludes it, any economic benefit is generally
taxable.
The Supreme Court further refined the definition of income in
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, holding that the Code taxes
“undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the
taxpayers have complete dominion.”101 Thus, if a taxpayer has received
something of value that makes them better off economically and there are
no contingencies involved, they are generally subject to tax (unless an
exception applies).
Several important principles flow from Code section 61 and Glenshaw
Glass. First, source is generally irrelevant in determining whether
something is income. Individuals are taxed on accessions to wealth
whether they come from an employer, investment, a sale of property, a
windfall like winning the lottery, or even money found on the street.102
Second, accessions to wealth of any form are taxable unless an
exception applies, whether the benefit is cash, property, or services. This
is why someone who wins a prize on a game show is taxable on the fair

99

See, e.g., Cesarini v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 3, 4 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (“The starting
point in determining whether an item is to be included in gross income is, of course, Section
61(a) of Title 26 U.S.C.”).
100
I.R.C. § 61(a). The statute goes on to provide a non-exclusive list of items of gross
income, such as compensation for services, interest, rents, royalties, and dividends. Id.
101
348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
102
See, e.g., Cesarini, 296 F. Supp. at 4 (holding that cash found in a used piano constituted
taxable income under I.R.C. § 61(a)); Turner v. Comm’r, 13 T.C.M. 462, 463 (1954) (holding
that cruise tickets received as a prize from a radio station constituted taxable income, with the
only issue being valuation); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 (as amended in 1993) (expanding
§ 61(a) definition of gross income to include illegal gains and treasure troves, while clarifying
that “[i]n addition to the items enumerated in section 61(a), there are many other kinds of gross
income”).
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market value of the prize, even if they received no cash.103 Similarly, if
someone receives services in lieu of cash, they are taxed on the fair market
value of the services. For example, if a plumber exchanges plumbing
services with a dentist for dental services, both individuals are taxable on
the benefit of services received.104
Accordingly, any nudge that provides an economic benefit to the
recipient will be treated as taxable income unless an exception applies
(discussed further below). This is the case regardless of whether or not
the benefit is in the form of cash.
2. Exceptions
There are numerous exceptions to the general rule that all economic
accessions to wealth are income for tax purposes. This Subsection
discusses those exceptions that might be relevant to the taxation of nudges
or BBS.105
a. Gifts
First, gifts and inheritances are not taxed as income.106 Whether
something is a gift for tax purposes depends on the intent of the person
giving the purported gift. The test, created by the Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Duberstein, is whether the donor acted with “detached
and disinterested generosity . . . out of affection, respect, admiration,
charity, or like impulses.”107 Payments made out of “any moral or legal
duty” or in anticipation of an economic benefit, on the other hand, do not
constitute gifts.108
A classic gift would be a transfer between family members: if a
grandmother sends her grandson $50 for his birthday, there are no income
tax consequences, because her motivation is presumably generosity and
affection. On the other hand, if a payment is made with an expectation of
a quid pro quo, the transfer will not be treated as a gift. In Duberstein, the
103

See I.R.C. § 74 (a).
See Topic No. 420 Bartering Income, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc420
[https://perma.cc/4XMQ-EASH] (last visited June 20, 2019).
105
The discussion omits other exclusions not relevant for this purpose, such as the nontaxation of imputed income under the Code, the realization requirement (§ 1001), and statutory
exclusions like § 101 (life insurance proceeds) and § 103 (interest on state and local bonds).
106
I.R.C. § 102.
107
363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
108
Id.
104
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court held that a car described as a “present” was not a gift for tax
purposes because the transferor, who was a business associate of the
transferee, gave the car to preserve the business relationship.109
Incentive-based nudges or subsidies that come from the government
generally will not qualify for gift treatment, because they are not
motivated out of detached and disinterested generosity as required by
Duberstein. For example, in Revenue Ruling 2003-12, the IRS ruled that
government payments to assist disaster victims with medical,
transportation, and housing expenses were not gifts, though they qualified
for exclusion under other rules.110 Similarly, in Revenue Ruling 2005-46,
government disaster relief payments were not gifts because “the
government's intent in making the payments proceeds from a
government's duty to relieve the hardship caused by the disaster.”111
Because the IRS considers government payments to stem from a moral or
legal duty, rather than generosity, affection, or the like as required by
Duberstein, those payments generally will not receive gift treatment.
Payments from employers also do not satisfy the detached and
disinterested generosity standard.112 Congress has codified this in Code
section 102(c), which prohibits employer payments from receiving gift
treatment under any circumstance. Thus, even if an employer calls a
bonus or noncash benefit a “gift,” the Code taxes it as compensation.113
Accordingly, nudges like wellness program incentives coming from
employers will never receive gift treatment.
There is one scenario where nudges and subsidies are likely to be
excluded from the recipient’s income as a gift, and that is when the benefit
comes from a charitable organization. In the same revenue ruling in which
the IRS found government payments to assist disaster victims are not
gifts, it ruled that those payments are gifts when made by a charitable
organization.114 When the payer is a charity organized to assist disaster
victims, the IRS ruled, grants are made out of detached and disinterested

109

Id. at 280, 291–92 (The transfer was “at bottom a recompense for Duberstein's past
services, or an inducement for him to be of further service in the future.”).
110
Specifically, Code section 139 and the general welfare doctrine, both of which are
discussed below. Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283–84.
111
Rev. Rul. 2005-46, 2005-2 C.B. 120.
112
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2003-12, supra note 110, at 283.
113
The exception is that certain employee achievement awards are excludable under
I.R.C§ 74(c) (2018).
114
Rev. Rul. 2003-12, supra note 110, at 284–85.
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generosity, rather than out of moral or legal duty.115 The IRS has similarly
ruled that payments to individuals from charities are gifts in many other
contexts, including matching funds deposited into adult savings
accounts,116 payments to honor military pilots who have lost their lives in
the line of duty,117 and payments to foreign nongovernment organizations
to assist with education.118
Applying these rules to nudges, consider the case of paying cash to
drug addicts to incentivize them to stay clean. If a charitable nonprofit
that was organized specifically to help reduce addiction made the cash
payments, those payments would likely be treated as gifts and excluded
from income under section 102. However, similarly structured payments
from the government would not receive such treatment and would be
taxable unless another exclusion applies.
b. Fringe Benefits
The Code also exempts certain fringe benefits paid by employers to
their employees from income.119 The term “fringe benefits” generally
refers to noncash benefits an employer provides as compensation, such as
health insurance or free food.120 Historically, these benefits were treated
as income for tax purposes, yet the IRS frequently did not enforce the
rules in this area.121

115

Id. at 283–84.
Rev. Rul. 99-44, 1999-44 I.R.B. 549–50. The matching contributions were gifts even
though the savings accounts were established pursuant to a federal government program,
which was administered by the charitable organization.
117
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200442023 (Oct. 15, 2004).
118
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200529004 (July 22, 2005). Although payments from charities to
individuals are likely to receive gift treatment in most situations, the Duberstein standard must
still be satisfied for the gift exclusion to apply. For example, the IRS has stated in informal
guidance that if a charity makes a payment to a for-profit business, “[t]he IRS will evaluate
whether . . . . the payment was made out of a moral or legal obligation, an anticipated
economic benefit or in return for services . . . .” Internal Revenue Service, Disaster Relief20,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3833.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ2W-R83D]. Generally,
payments made to individuals that are part of a “charitable class” (i.e., “large enough or
sufficiently indefinite that the community as a whole, rather than a pre-selected group of
people, benefits when a charity provides assistance”) should qualify for gift treatment. Id. at
9. I am grateful to Ellen Aprill for bringing this limitation to my attention.
119
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 132.
120
See Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Revisiting the Taxation of Fringe
Benefits, 91 Wash. L. Rev. 761, 770 (2016).
121
See id. at 766–68.
116
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As a concession to what was already a widespread practice, Congress
enacted Code section 132 in 1984, which enumerates specific fringe
benefits that are excluded from gross income.122 The listed exclusions
include “de minimis fringe[s],” which are benefits that are too small to
account for administratively (like free coffee); as well as “working
condition fringe[s],” the provision of free property or services that would
be deductible if purchased directly by the taxpayer (like airfare for a
business trip).123 Congress’s intent was clear that, unless enumerated in
section 132 or exempted elsewhere in the Code, fringe benefits continue
to be taxable.124 Several other Code sections exempt specific fringe
benefits. For example, section 106 excludes the benefits of employerprovided health insurance, and section 129 excludes certain dependent
care assistance programs.
In contrast to gifts, intent generally does not matter when it comes to
payments from employers to employees—payments are generally treated
as compensation unless excluded as fringe benefits.125 Code section
102(c) prevents gift treatment even if an employer labels a payment as a
“gift” (and even if the employer’s motive is generosity). In the context of
nudges, then, whether an incentive paid to an employee is taxable will
depend on whether it specifically qualifies for exclusion under section
132 or another Code provision. For example, if an employer occasionally
provides free fruit to employees to encourage healthier eating, that is
likely a de minimis fringe benefit, which is excludable under section
132.126 However, unless a nudge or BBS fits into a particular statutory
exclusion, benefits given to employees by their employer will generally
be taxed as compensation.127
122

Id. at 769–70.
I.R.C. § 132(d), (e).
124
See Soled & Thomas, supra note 120, at 770.
125
However, if an employee is a shareholder or owner of the employer, payments made to
employees may be treated as dividends rather than as compensation. See, e.g., Andrew W.
Stumpff, The Reasonable Compensation Rule, 19 Va. Tax. Rev. 371, 377 (1999).
126
I.R.C. § 132(a)(4), (e).
127
In a similar context but outside the employment setting, a court allowed for exclusion of
an all-expenses-paid business trip to Germany because the payment was made for the
convenience of the payer, rather than for the recipient’s benefit. United States v. Gotcher, 401
F.2d 118, 119, 122 (5th Cir. 1968). Neither courts nor the IRS have explicitly extended the
line of reasoning in Gotcher to other settings, particularly to non-business settings. However,
the line of reasoning in the case could arguably apply to exclude many nudges from income.
The argument would be that payments made primarily for the payer’s benefit (e.g., a
government grant program) are not taxable income to the payee. Thanks to Ted Seto for this
observation.
123
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c. Purchase Price Adjustments
Another income exclusion that may be relevant to some nudges is the
purchase price adjustment doctrine. Though not explicitly provided for in
the Code, both courts and the IRS have excluded certain economic
benefits from income if they can be characterized as an adjustment to the
purchase price between a buyer and a seller.128 Imagine, for example, that
a taxpayer purchased a $20,000 car and later received a $1,000
manufacturer’s rebate. Rather than taxing the buyer on $1,000 of income
at the time of the rebate, the IRS treats the transaction as an adjustment to
the original purchase price: the taxpayer is simply treated as having paid
$19,000 for the car, and is not taxed on the rebate.129
To qualify as a purchase price adjustment, the benefit provided to the
taxpayer generally must come from the party who sold the taxpayer goods
or services. In rare cases, courts have allowed purchase price adjustment
treatment for a benefit provided by a third party as long as the overall
effect of the arrangement is a purchase price reduction on a sale to the
taxpayer. For example, in Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Commissioner, a
cash payment made to a newspaper buyer by a third-party broker was not
taxable because the purpose of the cash payment was to induce the buyer
to make the purchase, and the overall effect of the transaction was a
reduction in the price paid by the buyer.130
The purchase price adjustment doctrine excludes many common
benefits provided by retailers, like bonus rewards programs, coupons, and
other discounts. However, if the benefit cannot be characterized as a
reduction in the price for goods or services paid by the taxpayer, the
benefit is generally taxable. For example, when Citibank rewarded
customers with airline miles for opening checking accounts, the Tax

128

See, e.g., Pittsburgh Milk Co. v. Comm’r, 26 T.C. 707, 717 (1956); Freedom
Newspapers, Inc. v. Comm’r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1755, 1758–59 (1977); Rev. Rul. 76-96,
1976-1 C.B. 23.
129
See Rev. Rul. 76-96, 1976-1 C.B. 23. The taxpayer must reduce his basis in the property
purchased by the amount of the rebate, resulting in a basis of $19,000 in this example.
130
Freedom Newspapers, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1756–57. But see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
201004005 (Jan. 29, 2010) (ruling that grants paid by a third party were not excludable from
income, even when the net effect was to reduce the buyer’s cost on a purchase transaction). In
the private ruling, the IRS distinguished payments involving broker commissions, which are
dependent upon the sales transactions, from third-party grants that are independent of the
transaction. Id.
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Court held the value of the miles was taxable income.131 In the case, the
taxpayer did not have to pay a fee for opening the account, so the miles
could not be characterized as a reduction in that fee. Instead, the court
likened the free miles to interest earned on a deposit.132 In contrast, airline
miles or “cash back” rewards earned for the use of a credit card should be
excludable under the purchase price doctrine, because they are more akin
to rebates of credit card fees owed by the cardholder.133
A nudge that provides value to a customer who is paying for goods or
services may qualify as a purchase price adjustment, as discussed further
below. To qualify, however, it is likely that the benefit must be provided
directly by the seller of goods and services, and not by a third party.
d. The General Welfare Doctrine
Payments from a federal, state, or local government are also taxable to
individuals unless an exception applies.134 For example, the Ninth Circuit
held that dividend payments made to each Alaskan citizen from the
Alaska Permanent Fund constituted income for federal income tax
purposes.135 The court rejected gift treatment in that case because the clear
legislative intent behind the dividend payments was to encourage people

131

The taxpayer received “Thank You Points” that were redeemable for airline miles.
Shankar v. Comm’r, 143 T.C. 140, 148 (2014). The court also noted that the miles were not
earned during business travel, which the IRS has singled out for non-enforcement in
Announcement 2002-18, 2002-1 C.B. 621.
132
Shankar, 143 T.C. at 148.
133
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201027015, at 3 (July 9, 2010) (ruling that cash-back rebates
are excluded from gross income as purchase price reductions).
134
For taxpayers that are corporations, Code § 118 historically exempted “contributions to
capital,” which covered many government grants to corporations. However, section 118 was
amended in 2017 and currently does not exempt contributions to capital made by “any
governmental entity.” I.R.C. § 118(b). Regardless, this Article is concerned with incentives
provided to individual taxpayers, not corporations.
There are other special exclusions applicable to businesses not discussed in detail here. For
example, Code § 48(d)(3) excludes grants made to developers and producers of renewable
energy, pursuant to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
135
Greisen v. United States, 831 F.2d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1987). The Alaska Permanent Fund
is funded by the state’s mineral royalties; it distributes earnings in the form of dividends to
each resident of the state on an annual basis. Id. at 916–17; see also About Us, Alaska
Department of Revenue: Permanent Fund Dividend Division, https://pfd.alaska.gov/DivisionInfo/About-Us [https://perma.cc/QHG2-M67C] (last visited July 1, 2019) (explaining the
Alaska Permanent Fund eligibility and dividend calculation functions).
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to remain residents of Alaska, rather than detached and disinterested
generosity.136
Courts have recognized an exception to the taxability of government
grants, referred to as the “general welfare exception.”137 The doctrine
originated with the IRS, which has ruled that government payments made
under “social benefit programs for the promotion of the general welfare”
are not included in the recipient’s gross income.138 For example, welfare
payments made under programs like Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (“TANF”) are generally excluded from income under the
doctrine because TANF is a social benefit program that promotes general
welfare.139
To be excluded from income under the general welfare doctrine, a
government grant must: (1) be made for the promotion of general welfare,
which means it must be based on need; and (2) not be paid as
compensation for services.140 Government payments made to assist
natural disaster victims141 or crime victims142 qualify as need-based grants
for this purpose, as do home rehabilitation grants paid to low-income
homeowners.143
Government grants that are not need-based do not qualify for the
general welfare exception and are generally taxable unless another
exception applies. For example, in Bailey v. Commissioner, the Tax Court
136
Greisen, 831 F.2d at 919–20 (“According to the statement of purpose, the 1980 Act was
intended: (1) to allow equitable distribution of part of the state's wealth to Alaskans; (2) to
encourage people to remain Alaska residents; and (3) to encourage awareness and interest in
the management of the fund.”).
137
See, e.g., Graff v. Comm’r, 673 F.2d 784, 785 (5th Cir. 1982). For a comprehensive
discussion of the doctrine, see Theodore P. Seto & Sande L. Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability
to Pay and the Taxation of Difference, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1053, 1106–14 (2006); see generally
Robert W. Wood & Richard C. Morris, The General Welfare Exception to Gross Income, 109
Tax Notes 203, 204–08 (2005) (describing the development of the General Welfare Exception
and the prongs of the test determining whether a payment qualifies).
138
Rev. Rul. 2005-46, 2005-2 C.B. 120; see also Rev. Rul. 74-205, 1974-1 C.B. 20 (ruling
that housing payments to displaced families qualified under the general welfare exception, and
were not includible in gross incomes of the recipients); Rev. Rul. 98-19, 1998-1 C.B. 840
(ruling that a relocation payment made to an individual moving from a flood-damaged
residence qualified for the general welfare exception).
139
I.R.S. Notice 99-3, 1999-1 C.B. 271, 272.
140
Rev. Rul. 2005-46, supra note 138.
141
Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-1 C.B. 283; Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17. However, the
IRS has ruled that payments to businesses do not qualify for the doctrine, because the need
must be “individual or family” based. See Rev. Rul. 2005-46, supra note 138.
142
Rev. Rul. 74-74, 1974-1 C.B. 18.
143
Rev. Rul. 76-395, 1976-2 C.B. 16.
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held that a local government grant paid to the taxpayer to improve the
façade of his building did not qualify for the general welfare exception.144
Because recipients qualified for the grant simply by owning properties in
specific areas, the court found the grant was not based on “need.”145
Although some nudges and BBS come in the form of government
grants, to qualify for exclusion under the general welfare doctrine, they
must be need-based, which generally means either financial hardship or
that the recipient is being compensated for a crime or natural disaster.
Payments made by a local government to improve the health of its
citizens, for example, would likely fail to qualify under this doctrine.
e. Qualified Disaster Mitigation Payments
When it comes to natural disasters, the general welfare doctrine
exempts from income government payments made to assist disaster
victims. Additionally, Code section 139(a) excludes from income
government relief payments made to victims of federally declared
disasters.146 But what if a government provides grants to mitigate the
damage of potential disasters before they happen? In narrowly defined
circumstances, those payments are also exempt from tax.
Specifically, Code section 139(g) excludes “qualified disaster
mitigation payment[s]” from gross income. To qualify under the section,
a payment must be made to a property owner for “hazard mitigation,”
pursuant to either the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act or the National Flood Insurance Act.147 In other words,
mitigation payments made through one of these two specific, federally
authorized programs are exempt under the statute, but payments pursuant
to a state or local mitigation program will not qualify for the exemption.
Thus, nudges or BBS that are designed to mitigate disasters will generally
not qualify for exclusion under section 139(g), unless the payments are
made pursuant to the specified federal programs.
144
88 T.C. 1293, 1301 (1987), acq. 1989-2 C.B. 1. The court excluded the grant from income
on other grounds, however, finding that the taxpayer “lacked complete dominion” over the
funds, which were paid directly to the contractor who did the work.
145
Id. (noting that the only requirements to receive the grant “were ownership of the
property and compliance with the building code”).
146
The exclusion applies to “qualified disaster[s],” which also includes events involving
terrorism or common carrier accidents. See I.R.C. § 139(c). For a critique of limiting the
exclusion to qualified disasters only, see Ellen P. Aprill & Richard Schmalbeck, Post-Disaster
Tax Legislation: A Series of Unfortunate Events, 56 Duke L.J. 51, 95 (2006).
147
I.R.C. § 139(g).
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B. Non-Taxable Nudges
As discussed above, the starting point for taxation under the Code is
income, which is a clearly realized accession to wealth. Accordingly,
those nudges described in Section I.B that do not represent economic
benefits to the recipient have no tax implications. The nontaxable
categories include defaults, information, simplification, and appeals to
social norms. Examples of such nudges are automatic enrollment into
organ donation programs, simplification of instructions or other
disclosures, text message reminders, salient warnings on cigarettes, and
letters reminding taxpayers that others in their community are compliant.
What about defaults, reminders, or other nudges that ultimately have
financial consequences? Consider, for example, automatic enrollment
into savings programs. Imagine a typical worker who is prone to status
quo bias, and would not go through the trouble of enrolling in a savings
program at the start of his employment. If the worker did not otherwise
have any savings, his investment income would be zero.
Now assume that the worker is automatically enrolled into a savings
plan when he starts his job, which sets aside 3% of his salary into a 401(k)
plan. In this scenario, he has investment income. Does this mean that the
nudge provided a taxable benefit? Under the tax law, the answer is clearly
no. Although the worker has earned income in the nudge scenario, default
enrollment itself is not a source of income. Rather, the income comes
from the investment in the savings plan, which would be taxed according
to the Code. In this example, Code section 401(k) would defer income on
the earnings, but this is irrelevant to the analysis.148 We could imagine a
nudge that encouraged taxpayers to set aside money in a taxable savings
account, for example, that earned interest or dividend income. The
earnings would be taxed under Code section 61 as investment income, but
the nudge itself would not be taxable.149
In sum, some nudges, like defaults, information, or reminders, may
encourage the taxpayer to enter into taxable transactions. But the nudges
themselves are not taxable because it is not the behavioral intervention
that gives rise to the income, but rather the transaction that the nudge was
designed to encourage.

148
149

I.R.C. § 401(k).
I.R.C. § 61.
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C. Taxable Nudges and Behaviorally Based Subsidies
In contrast to interventions like defaults or reminders, nudges that
provide incentives, as well as any BBS, are accessions to wealth that
generally constitute economic income. As such, these incentives are
taxable unless specifically excluded by the Code or a judicial doctrine.
The following section discusses the tax consequences of the incentivebased nudges discussed above in Section I.B., as well as BBS.
1. Workplace Wellness Programs
Benefits offered by employers through workplace wellness programs
are generally taxable as compensation as a default matter. However, there
are several statutory exclusions that are relevant in this context. First,
wellness rewards will be excluded from income if they qualify as de
minimis fringe benefits under Code section 132. De minimis fringe
benefits include “any property or service the value of which is . . . so
small as to make accounting for it unreasonable or administratively
impracticable.”150
Second, Code section 106 excludes employer-provided health
insurance from an employee’s income.151 The section 106 exclusion also
applies to insurance premiums that are deducted (pretax) from an
employee’s salary and paid by the employer on the employee’s behalf.152
Finally, under Code section 105, amounts paid to an employee through an
employer-provided health plan to reimburse the employee for medical
expenses are excluded from income.153
To start with the easiest cases, cash or cash-equivalent rewards in any
amount are clearly taxable.154 For example, if a wellness program offers
a cash reward, or gift certificates in a specific dollar denomination, for
losing weight or hitting other fitness goals, those benefits are taxable as
compensation under Code section 61.155 A gift certificate for $100 to a
local restaurant would be taxed in the same manner as if the person

150

I.R.C. § 132(e).
I.R.C. § 106(a).
152
Rev. Rul. 2002-3, 2002-1 C.B. 316 (“Under §106(a), an employee may exclude
premiums for accident or health insurance coverage that are paid by an employer.”).
153
I.R.C. § 105(b).
154
See, e.g., Office of Chief Counsel Internal Revenue Service Memorandum 201622031,
at 1 (Apr. 14, 2016) [hereinafter “IRS Memo 201622031”].
155
I.R.C. § 61.
151

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

602

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 107:571

received $100 in cash, regardless of whether or not the gift certificate was
redeemed.156
It should be noted that even very small amounts of cash or cash
equivalents are never treated as de minimis fringe benefits under Code
section 132(e). This is because, to qualify as de minimis, it must be
unreasonable or administratively impracticable to value the benefit.157
Cash and gift certificates are never difficult to value, and thus are taxable
compensation to employees, no matter how small.158 Additionally, cash
rewards and gift certificates will not qualify for exclusion under Code
section 105 because they are not reimbursements for medical expenses.
Other common wellness program rewards are not cash equivalents, but
rather are token items, like t-shirts, coffee mugs, or tote bags. In those
cases, the rewards likely would qualify for exclusion from income as de
minimis fringe benefits under Code section 132(e). Although the
regulations do not specifically address these items, they are analogous to
other de minimis fringe benefits listed in the regulation examples, such as
“birthday or holiday gifts of property (not cash) with a low fair market
value” and “flowers, fruit, books, or similar property provided to
employees under special circumstances.”159 Furthermore, in informal
guidance, the IRS has stated that a token reward like a t-shirt received
under a wellness program constitutes a de minimis fringe.160
Wellness program gifts that are not token items, however, might cross
the line into taxable territory. IRS guidance generally requires token
awards to have a low fair market value to qualify as de minimis, although
they do not specify where to draw the line in dollars.161 For example,
occasional sporting tickets are a de minimis fringe benefit under the
regulations but season tickets are not.162 It follows that a generous reward
given as part of a wellness program would likely be taxable. For example,
if an employer awarded a new car to the employee that achieved the
highest level of a fitness goal, the fair market value of the car would
clearly be taxable income.
156

Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(c) (as amended in 1992).
I.R.C. § 132(e).
158
Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(c) (as amended in 1992). The exception to this rule is cash for
occasional overtime meals or transportation fare can be excluded as de minimis. See Treas.
Reg. § 132-6(d)(2) (as amended in 1992).
159
Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1) (as amended in 1992) (“Benefits excludable from income”).
160
IRS Memo 201622031 at 4.
161
Id. at 4.
162
See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1)–(2) (as amended in 1992).
157
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Other common wellness program incentives are in the form of services
rather than property, such as free biometric screenings, seminars, gym
memberships, health coaching, or smoking cessation programs.163 In
general, the receipt of services by employees constitutes taxable income
in the amount of the fair market value of the services.164 However,
services received in connection with wellness programs may be
excludable if either section 132 or section 105 applies.
First, section 132(e) provides that an excludable de minimis fringe
benefit may take the form of services, so services of a sufficiently small
value should qualify. The frequency of the service is also relevant to the
determination of whether it is de minimis.165 The regulations point to free
phone service to make local telephone calls as an example of a de minimis
fringe benefit, while use of an employer-owned vehicle to commute more
than once a month is not de minimis.166
Second, if the services offered by the wellness program constitute
medical care, then they should be excluded from the employee’s income
under Code section 105(b), even if the value of the services is not de
minimis.167 Since section 105(b) excludes employer reimbursements for
medical care from income, the IRS treats providing access to free medical
services as similarly excludable.168
Health screenings and some health-related services, like smoking
cessation programs, constitute medical care under the tax law and are thus
excludable from income under section 105(b) when offered as part of a
wellness program.169 Other services like health coaching and weight loss
programs may not qualify as medical care and would therefore likely be
taxable unless they qualify as de minimis fringe benefits.170
163

See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (as amended in 2003).
165
I.R.C. § 132(e)(1).
166
Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1)–(2) (as amended in 1992).
167
See IRS Memo 201622031 at 2, 4–5. “Medical care” is defined in section 105(b) by
reference to section 213(d) of the Code, which provides that medical care includes amounts
paid “for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose
of affecting any structure or function of the body.” I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A).
168
See IRS Memo 201622031 at 2, 5.
169
See id. For examples of medical care under section 213, including smoking cessation
programs, see IRS Publication 502, Medical and Dental Expenses, https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/p502.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GGF-RMV3] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
170
Medical expenses include payments for a weight-loss program “for a specific disease
diagnosed by a physician,” so it is unlikely that a weight-loss program would qualify in the
absence of a diagnosis. See IRS Publication 502, supra note 169.
164
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Occasional seminars and educational programs, which are likely
offered infrequently, probably qualify as de minimis fringe benefits and
should be excluded from employees’ income.171 Other services, however,
like free health coaching and Weight Watchers meetings, may be too
valuable and frequent to constitute de minimis fringe benefits. Provision
of these services should probably be taxed to employees at their fair
market value, although it is unclear if employers actually report them as
income.172
Private gym memberships are specifically included in the section 132
regulations as an example of a benefit that is too valuable to be de
minimis, and the regulations note that it does not matter if the employee
actually uses the membership or not.173 Gym memberships also do not
constitute medical expenses and will not qualify for exclusion under
section 105(b). Thus, free gym or health club memberships offered by
wellness programs will be taxable to the employees at their fair market
value.174
Discounts on gym memberships (or similar, non-medical services)
should also constitute taxable income to employees in the amount of the
discount. Although section 132 does provide that “qualified employee
discount[s]” are excludable fringe benefits,175 the discount offered must
be related to the employer’s line of business.176 For example, a clothing
store can offer its employees a tax-free discount on clothing, but cannot
offer tax-free discounts on unrelated products or services.177
Another common wellness program benefit is to offer employees: (1)
a reduction in health insurance premiums owed; or (2) reimbursement of
premiums paid, in exchange for hitting certain health targets.178
Reductions in health insurance premiums offered for wellness program
participation should be tax-free to employees. If the health insurance
company lowers its rates and that rate reduction is passed on to the
171
See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1) (as amended in 1992) (citing examples of “occasional”
events, such as sports games or cocktail parties, as ones that qualify as de minimis).
172
In an analogous context, it appears many service-type benefits offered by Silicon Valley
companies, such as free dry cleaning, haircuts, or yoga classes, are likely not reported as
taxable by those employers. See Soled & Thomas, supra note 120, at 779–86.
173
Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(2) (as amended in 1992). However, onsite gyms operated by
the employer qualify for exclusion. See I.R.C. § 132(j)(4).
174
See IRS Memo 201622031 at 4–5.
175
I.R.C. § 132(a)(2).
176
I.R.C. § 132(c)(4).
177
It follows that a private gym could offer discounted gym services to its own employees.
178
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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employee, the employee would not be taxed on the discount because it
would constitute a purchase price adjustment.179 If the insurance company
does not lower its premiums and the discount instead comes from the
employer assuming the excess cost on the employee’s behalf, the
reduction should still be excludable as employer-provided health
insurance under section 106.180
Reimbursements of premiums, however, do not qualify for exclusion
under section 106 and are taxable to employees.181 A common
arrangement is for employees to make pretax contributions to a wellness
plan as part of their employer sponsored health plan, and then to be
reimbursed for a portion of those contributions through wellness program
rewards, such as receiving a cash prize for taking a health screening
test.182 Because employees are initially allowed to pay those premiums
pretax under section 106, the IRS has ruled that employees may not then
receive a cash reimbursement of those funds tax-free.183
In sum, the tax consequences of employer wellness program rewards
vary depending on the benefit provided. Free healthcare services and
token prizes are excludable as either medical care or de minimis fringe
benefits. However, cash prizes, gift certificates, gym memberships, and
rewards of significant value generally will be taxable to employees, as
will reimbursements of insurance premiums.
2. Non-Employer Health Nudges
The exclusions provided by section 132 (fringe benefits), section 106
(employer-provided health insurance), and section 105 (employer
reimbursement of medical expenses) are limited to the employment
context. Therefore, if someone other than an employer provides nudges
in the form of health-related incentives, those awards are taxable unless
another exclusion applies.
In the case of incentives provided by private health insurance
providers, the purchase price adjustment doctrine likely applies. For
example, an insurance company might decide to reward policyholders for
quitting smoking, since smoking increases healthcare costs. If the
insurance company offers cash in exchange for a policyholder completing
179

See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
See supra note 152.
181
See IRS Memo 201622031 at 5.
182
See id. at 2–5.
183
See Rev. Rul. 2002-3, supra note 152.
180
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a smoking cessation program, the cash award would likely be considered
a rebate of the premiums paid by the policyholder. As such, the rebate
would be a non-taxable purchase price adjustment.
This analysis likely does not hold for recipients of public insurance like
Medicaid, however. If Medicaid provided cash rewards for smoking
cessation, as proposed by some researchers,184 the reward could not be
characterized as a nontaxable rebate because the recipient would not have
directly purchased the insurance services to begin with. In that case, the
incentives would be treated the same as any government-provided health
incentive.
How are health incentives treated when they do not come from
employers or private health insurers? Consider programs like the former
“Dollar a Day” paid to teens to not get pregnant,185 or a government
program that awards gift certificates or cash to drug addicts who stay
clean.186 There does not appear to be any statutory exception or judicial
doctrine that would exclude them from income. Even if the payments
come directly from government, the general welfare doctrine is unlikely
to exempt them unless the program is considered to be need-based.187
One might argue that some narrowly tailored health incentive programs
are need-based. For example, if a local government gives cash to addicts
who get clean, the “need” might be described as drug addiction. Although
this argument is not without merit, there is no precedent supporting this
approach. To date, the general welfare exception has only been applied
by the IRS in cases of economic hardship or to victims of crime or natural
disasters.188
Some health-related nudges provide benefits in connection with
programs that would be tax deductible if paid for directly by the recipient.
For example, if an individual pays out of pocket for an inpatient drug
rehabilitation program, the payment would qualify as a deductible
medical expense under Code section 213.189 This raises the question of
whether individuals should be taxed on the receipt of incentives that
would be tax deductible if they paid for them directly. One could argue
184

See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
186
See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text; 75–77 and accompanying text.
187
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
188
See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text.
189
See IRS Publication 502, supra note 169. However, the deduction is only available to
itemizers (those who do not claim the standard deduction) and is limited to the excess of 10%
of the individual’s adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 213(a).
185
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that since an individual is not taxed on income that he spends on medical
care directly (because those amounts are deductible), he similarly should
not be taxed when the same medical care services are purchased by a third
party.
In two analogous situations, payment of expenses that would be
deductible as medical expenses if paid by the recipient are excluded when
a third party pays them. One is the scenario contemplated by Code section
105(b), which excludes reimbursements by employers of employee
medical expenses.190 The other is Code section 104, which excludes, from
income, recoveries paid to victims of physical injury.191 For example, if a
person is injured in a car accident and is paid compensation for her
physical injuries by the motorist at fault, she is not taxed on the recovery.
If she had instead paid her own medical bills from the car accident and
not recovered compensation, those expenses would theoretically be
deductible under section 213 (although in practice, only if she claimed
itemized deductions).
In the case of government programs that provide health incentives,
such as a grant to attend a private drug rehab center, neither section 104
nor 105 applies. In those cases, the government is not an employer and
the money is not received as compensation for a personal injury. Thus,
the recipient is likely taxable on the benefit. The fact that Congress carved
out the two exceptions in sections 104 and 105 supports the notion that,
outside of those narrowly defined circumstances of employment or injury
compensation, payments for medical care are income.192
In sum, although such benefits might not be reported in practice, the
provision of free health incentives may be taxable even if they constitute
medical care under the Code, if those incentives do not come from an
employer or health insurance company. Incentives that take the form of
cash, such as paying drug addicts to stay clean, present an even easier case
for taxation than the provision of medical services.
3. Green Nudges
The taxability of environmental nudges depends largely on who is
providing the incentive. As discussed above, one common green nudge is
190

I.R.C. § 105(b).
I.R.C. § 104(a).
192
Another exception, which would be irrelevant in this circumstance, is section 102, which
would exclude from income medical care paid for by family members or friends. See I.R.C.
§ 102(a).
191
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for a utility company to provide incentives to its customers to use less
energy. Those incentives may be property, like free light bulbs, or cash
rebates on energy efficient appliances.193
Regardless of the form the incentive takes, if the benefit comes from a
utility provider, the purchase price adjustment doctrine likely excludes
the benefit from the customer’s income. Consider, for example, a
homeowner who receives a $200 cash reward from her electricity
provider for installing insulation in her attic.194 Assume this hypothetical
homeowner pays $100 per month to the utility company, for a total cost
of $1,200 per year for electricity. Rather than being taxed on the $200
cash reward, the homeowner should be able to treat the cash as a reduction
in the cost of the utility service for that year. In other words, the
homeowner’s overall utility cost would be re-characterized as $1,000
($1,200 annual cost less the $200 reward). This is consistent with the
IRS’s treatment of rebates in other contexts, like a manufacturer’s rebate
on the purchase of a car.195
The fact that the reward for installing insulation in the preceding
example is structured differently than the car purchase rebate should not
change the tax treatment. Both courts and the IRS have made clear that a
purchase price adjustment can be a direct reduction of the purchase price
(as in the case of a car rebate) or an indirect reduction of the purchase
price.196 In the utility company example, the reward for installing
insulation is not structured as a credit against the customer’s electricity
bill. This is likely because a cash reward is more salient and appealing.
However, the economic effect is identical: a $200 cash reward is no
different than a monthly reduction in utility costs that amounts to $200.
Either scenario is ultimately a reduction in the amount owed to the utility
company from the customer, and the $200 benefit comes directly from
the utility company in both instances. Thus, the purchase price reduction
doctrine should apply to exclude these types of nudges from taxation.
Other green incentives come from governments rather than from
energy providers. In those cases, incentives are likely to be taxable unless

193

See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra note 87.
195
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
196
For example, in Freedom Newspapers v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1755 (1977),
the Tax Court held that even a payment received by a third party broker several years after the
original purchase “was sufficiently tied to the purchase that its characterization must be made
by reference to the original transaction.”
194
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either of: 1) the general welfare doctrine or 2) Code section 139(g)
applies. Recall that section 139(g) applies only in narrow situations: it
excludes, from income, hazard mitigation grants that are paid pursuant to
either the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act or the National Flood Insurance Act.197 Any government mitigation
assistance that is not payable under those programs will not qualify for
exclusion under the Code.
That leaves the general welfare doctrine, which only excludes
payments based on “need.” In the context of natural disasters and other
environmental harms, the doctrine creates an odd tax result. Payments
from governments to help victims of disasters that have already occurred
are clearly excludable under the doctrine.198 But payments to mitigate
harms from future disasters are not, because those grants are not
considered to be need-based.
Consider the case of earthquake mitigation payments like those paid by
California to residents in high risk areas to incentivize them to retrofit
their homes.199 In recent informal guidance, the IRS ruled the grants are
taxable because they are not paid pursuant to the specific federal programs
required by Code section 139(g), and they do not qualify for the general
welfare exception.200 In ruling that the general welfare doctrine does not
apply, the IRS noted that: 1) the grants are not based on “individual or
family need” because they are based on the location and physical
characteristics of the recipient’s home; and 2) the grants are not paid “to
alleviate suffering and damage resulting from a disaster” but instead are
paid “to mitigate the effects of future disasters.”201 In what appears to be
a concession to the accuracy of this interpretation of federal law,
California lawmakers have proposed federal tax legislation that would

197

I.R.C. § 139(g).
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
199
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
200
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201816004 (Jan. 11, 2018). See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201815005
(Jan. 11, 2018) (describing similar facts).
One theory that the IRS did not appear to consider is the purchase price adjustment doctrine.
See supra Subsection II.A.2. Arguably, a state grant paid to a state taxpayer could be
considered a non-taxable adjustment to the amount of taxes owed to the state by the grant
recipient. (This assumes the grant recipient earns enough income to owe state taxes in excess
of the grant.) While it is hard to distinguish a state grant from a seller rebate on economic
grounds, it appears neither courts nor the IRS have extended the purchase price adjustment
doctrine to this context. I am grateful to Heather Field for this observation.
201
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201816004 (Jan 11. 2018).
198
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specifically exclude the earthquake mitigation grants from gross
income.202
4. Behaviorally Based Subsidies
Whether an incentive can fairly be described as a nudge or is better
characterized as a subsidy has no bearing on its tax consequences. In the
case of earthquake mitigation grants, for example, some of those
payments are in the thousands of dollars and are more of a subsidy than a
true nudge. Regardless, they are taxable income under current law. The
same goes for other types of incentive payments that qualify as subsidies.
The purchase price or general welfare doctrines may exempt them if the
subsidy comes from a seller or is need-based. Otherwise, they are likely
to be taxable, unless some other exception applies. Although the taxation
of subsidies may have different normative implications, the question of
taxability is not dependent on the size of the incentive.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Part II has revealed the disjointed state of the tax law when it comes to
nudges. Nudges that come from private parties are often tax-exempt,
while identical incentives that come from the government are taxable.
This Part now turns to the policy implications of the tax treatment of
nudges. It first considers whether, as a normative matter, it is desirable to
tax nudges. After arguing that taxing nudges is likely to counteract their
effectiveness, this Part then offers proposals for reform.
A. Should Nudges and BBS Be Taxed?
As discussed in Part II, many incentive-based nudges (and BBS) do not
qualify for exemption from income under the current tax rules. This
Section considers, from a normative perspective, whether such incentives
should be treated as income for tax purposes. The Section first examines
whether nudges are appropriately considered income for economic
purposes. It then discusses two analogues—gifts and scholarships—and
considers whether the justifications for including those transfers from
income should be extended to nudges and BBS.
202

See Earthquake Mitigation Incentive and Tax Parity Act of 2017, H.R. 1691, 115th Cong.
(2017); Earthquake Mitigation Incentive and Tax Parity Act of 2017, S. 2104, 115th Cong.
(2017).
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1. Do Nudges Constitute Economic Income?
Since Code section 61 taxes income from any source (unless otherwise
excluded), a useful starting point is to consider whether incentive-based
nudges and BBS constitute economic income. Personal income for
economic purposes is commonly defined as the sum of 1) the positive
change in an individual’s net wealth; plus 2) the amount of his
consumption.203 The intuition is that annual income necessarily comprises
everything an individual saves and spends during the year.
From an economic perspective, incentive-based nudges and BBS are
generally a positive change in wealth, regardless of whether they are
received in cash or in-kind. Indeed, many tax scholars have noted that
government transfers are clearly economic income for this reason,
notwithstanding the fact that the tax law often exempts them.204 Even
need-based government transfers, which currently qualify for exclusion
under the general welfare doctrine, constitute economic income because
they increase the individual’s wealth.205
If incentive-based nudges and BBS constitute economic income, the
next question is whether there is any normative reason to depart from the
default of including them in income for tax purposes. Indeed, for nearly a
century, tax scholars have been debating whether all items of economic
income should be included in the tax law’s definition of income (i.e., the
“tax base”), or whether some items should be considered outside the
scope of taxable income.206

203
See Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem
of Fiscal Policy 50 (1938); Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income–Economic and Legal
Aspects, in The Federal Income Tax 1, 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921). The definition is
commonly referred to as the Haig-Simons definition of income. See, e.g., John R. Brooks, The
Definitions of Income, 71 Tax L. Rev. 253, 262 (2018); Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive
Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 925, 932 (1967). For a
comprehensive discussion of the difficulty of defining income and a description of several
other approaches, see generally Brooks, supra; see also Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of
Income, 46 Tax L. Rev. 45, 47 (1990) (describing the Haig-Simons definition vis-à-vis the
general difficulty in defining income).
204
See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 203, at 935; Jonathan Barry Forman, The Income Tax
Treatment of Social Welfare Benefits, 26 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 785, 799 (1993).
205
Bittker, supra note 203, at 935–37.
206
The legal scholarship on this point is too voluminous to cite, but for some of the earliest
work, see, e.g., id. at 932; R. A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 Harv. L.
Rev. 44 (1967); Joseph A. Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 Harv.
L. Rev 63 (1967); Charles O. Galvin, More on Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Base:
The Practicalities of Tax Reform and the ABA’s CSTR, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1016 (1968). For a
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2. Nudges as Exclusions from the Tax Base: The Gift Analogy
Scholars have argued that certain items, like gifts, should be excluded
from the tax base even though they technically constitute economic
income. If nudges and BBS can be analogized to gifts, then a similar
argument may exist that they should be excluded.
The Code contains many “tax expenditures,” i.e., special preference
items that are part of the tax base but are not taxed because of some policy
choice made by Congress.207 Examples include the tax deduction for
mortgage interest (which encourages homeownership) and tax deferral for
individual retirement accounts (which encourages savings). 208
While gifts also receive special treatment under the Tax Code, they are
distinguishable from these other tax preferences because Code section
102 is not labeled by Congress as a tax expenditure.209 Rather, gifts are
simply treated as not part of the tax base.210 This is indicative of a view
that gifts, while perhaps constituting economic income as a technical
matter, should not be taxed in the same manner as other accessions to
wealth. In other words, there is a view that excluding gifts from income
is a more accurate way to tax individuals, rather than a special tax
preference.
Why should gifts be excluded from the tax base? As some scholars
have pointed out, the exclusion for gifts is a sensible approach when the
donor and donee are considered collectively.211 From a purely economic
standpoint, when a donor makes a gift, she has a decrease in wealth and
should be given a tax deduction. At the same time, the donee has a
discussion of the debate over the use of a “comprehensive tax base,” see Brooks, supra note
203, at 270–74.
207
See, e.g., Dep’t of Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Tax Expenditures (2017),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Tax-ExpendituresFY2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UVR-9ZKJ] [hereinafter “Tax Expenditures].
208
Id. at 9, 18.
209
Although the tax-free receipt of a gift by the donee is not labeled as an expenditure, the
carryover basis provided by section 1015 for appreciated gifts is considered a tax expenditure.
See J. Comm. on Tax’n, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2018–2022,
26 (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.jct.gov/publications/2018/jcx-81-18/ [https://perma.cc/33XYP3EB] [hereinafter “JCT Tax Expenditures”].
210
See Tax Expenditures, supra note 207, at 3 (“The normal tax baseline also excludes gifts
between individuals from gross income.”).
211
See, e.g., Richard Schmalbeck, Gifts and the Income Tax—An Enduring Puzzle, 73 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 63, 65 (2010) (arguing that “although it is intuitively appealing to regard
value received by gift as an element of the income of the individual receiving it, it is
completely unappealing to regard value received by gift as an increment to income in the
aggregate”).
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corresponding increase in wealth and should recognize income. The net
revenue effect in that scenario is zero, as the deduction offsets the income
inclusion.212 The approach taken by the Code, which is to deny a
deduction to the donor while excluding income to the donee, effectively
provides the same result, which is a net of zero.
If the economically correct treatment of gifts (deduction to the donor
and income inclusion for the donee) produces the same result as the
current approach under the Code (no deduction and no inclusion), it is
sensible to adopt the approach that is easier to administer. The Tax Code
does just that. Having neither party report the gift for income tax purposes
is unquestionably simpler because it means the gift need not be valued.213
Accordingly, Code section 102’s exclusion can be seen as a justifiable
approximation of the economically correct way to treat gifts.
Further, commentators have noted that gifts do not result in any net
increase in income, but rather are just a transfer of income from one party
to another.214 This can be contrasted with a market transaction, in which
one individual typically exchanges goods or services for payment. In the
latter scenario, both individuals are better off, and overall economic
wealth has increased, with each party receiving something new. In the gift
scenario, arguably only the donee is better off while the donor has not
received anything. Although scholars have debated this point, there is at
least an argument that gifts are rightfully treated differently than market
transactions for tax purposes.215
Although nudges and BBS do not constitute gifts for tax purposes,216
there is perhaps an analogous argument that they should not be taxed.
Consider the transfer of funds from a local government to an individual
212

Id. This of course assumes that the donor and the donee have the same tax rate. In reality,
donors likely have higher tax rates than donees, in which case the net effect would be revenue
loss to the government. For example, if the donor had a 30% marginal tax rate and the donee
had a 10% marginal tax rate, the donor’s deduction for a $100 gift would be worth $30 (30%
of $100), while the donee’s tax liability would be $10 (10% of $100), resulting in a $20
revenue loss.
213
For income tax purposes, the gift is a non-event and need not be reported. However, the
gift may need to be valued and returns filed if the gift tax applies. Currently, transfers under
$15,000 are exempt from the gift tax. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions on Gift Taxes,
IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/frequently-askedquestions-on-gift-taxes [https://perma.cc/23XD-GDZC] (last visited July 11, 2019).
214
E.g., Schmalbeck, supra note 211, at 65.
215
The counterargument is that the gift represents consumption purchased by the donor. For
a discussion of this theory, see id. at 68–69.
216
See supra Subsection II.A.2.
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to retrofit her house against earthquakes. The government is tax-exempt
and does not take a deduction on the transfer. Thus, allowing the recipient
to exclude the grant results in a net of zero tax revenue rather than net
revenue loss, just as in the gift scenario. At the same time, the government
has not received goods or services in exchange for the transfers; this is
not a market transaction.217 One might argue that, as in the gift context,
this is just a transfer of value from party A to party B that should not be
taxed. The weakness in this argument is that every government transfer
works this way (no deduction to the payer), yet the tax rules require
taxation of some such transfers.218
What about transfers that do not come from the government? Recall
that, in many of those cases, the tax law already provides exemptions
under either the purchase price adjustment doctrine or the section 132
fringe benefit rules. Some incentives are not covered by those rules,
however. Consider an employee wellness program that offers cash for
meeting fitness milestones, a benefit that is clearly taxable.219 In that case,
the gift analogy is not apt. The employer will likely deduct the payment
as compensation or a business expense,220 so allowing the employee to
exclude the payment would result in net revenue loss to the government.
Further, to the extent that the payment is made in the employment context,
it is arguably paid in connection with the employee’s services. Although
the employee has not necessarily performed extra services to receive the
payment, the employer likely intends the payment to be either: 1) an
incentive to remain employed to perform future services, and/or 2) a way
of enhancing the employee’s ability to perform services (by staying
healthy). Either of those scenarios looks much more like a market
transaction—one that gives rise to an increase in wealth for both the
employee and employer.
Thus, while the gift analogy might support an argument that some types
of nudges should not be taxed, particularly incentives paid by
governments, it is not a good analogy for payments by private parties,
especially if the payment is deductible.

217
For a similar argument, see Charlotte Crane, Government Transfer Payments and
Assistance: A Challenge for the Design of Broad-Based Taxes, 59 SMU L. Rev. 589, 611–12
(2006) (pointing out that government transfers do not create new value).
218
See, e.g., supra notes 134–135 and accompanying text.
219
See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
220
Either way, the payment is deductible under Code section 162.
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3. Nudges as Tax Expenditures: The Scholarship Analogy
Another useful analogy to nudges is that of scholarships. Unlike gifts,
the exclusion for scholarships under Code section 117 is currently
considered to be a tax expenditure.221 However, some commentators have
argued that scholarships should be excluded from the tax base for
economic reasons, rather than as a preference.222 Whether they are
properly excluded from the tax base or treated as tax preferences, there is
ample support for not taxing them.
Like gifts, scholarships are not deductible by the payer, because the
payer of a scholarship is generally tax-exempt (typically an educational
institution or another nonprofit). Thus, excluding scholarships from the
recipient’s income presents a net zero transaction, and not revenue loss,
for the government. Also, like gifts, scholarships are generally not paid as
compensation for services or property in a market transaction.223 The
recipient of the scholarship receives education at a reduced price but does
not confer goods or services upon the payer.
However, compared to gifts, the case for excluding scholarships from
the tax base is weaker. In the gift context, wealth is simply transferred
from one party to another, with no net increase in overall wealth. But with
scholarships, new value is being created and conferred. When an
221

JCT Tax Expenditures, supra note 209, at 27. The characterization of an exclusion as an
expenditure depends on how Congress defines the tax base, and this has changed over time.
See, e.g., Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget, 54 Hastings
L.J. 603, 608–10 (2003) (providing an overview of the development of the federal tax
expenditure budget).
The characterization of scholarships depends particularly on varying definitions of the tax
base, and Treasury has noted that:
From an economic point of view, scholarships and fellowships are either gifts not
conditioned on the performance of services, or they are rebates of educational costs.
Thus, under the baseline tax system of the reference law method, this exclusion is not
a tax expenditure . . . . The exclusion, however, is considered a tax expenditure under
the normal tax method, which includes gift-like transfers of Government funds in gross
income (many scholarships are derived directly or indirectly from Government
funding).
See Tax Expenditures, supra note 207 at 13.
222
See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Scholarships Under the Income Tax, 46 Tax Law. 697, 698–
99 (1993) (examining arguments for excluding scholarships from the tax base and for making
them a tax preference); Charlotte Crane, Scholarships and the Federal Income Tax Base, 28
Harv. J. on Legis. 63, 113 (1991) (same).
223
The exclusion in section 117 only covers scholarships paid for tuition and related
expenses. Although some scholarship funds are conditioned on the performance of services
like teaching or research, those funds are explicitly excluded from section 117 and are taxable.
I.R.C. § 117(c)(1).
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individual receives a scholarship that allows her to attend college for free,
for example, she is receiving valuable educational services, which likely
exceed the value of the scholarship itself.224 Regardless, some scholars
have argued that education is a unique benefit that is particularly hard to
value, which merits exclusion from the tax base.225
Further, to the extent scholarships reduce the price paid to attend an
educational institution, they arguably can be viewed as a nontaxable
purchase price adjustment.226 Even if scholarship funds come from
government sources or nonprofits, rather than from the educational
institution itself, the purchase price reduction precedent still suggests
exclusion is appropriate.227 Recall that, in other cases, courts have allowed
rebates to come from third parties, as long as the overall effect is to reduce
the price paid by the taxpayer on a purchase transaction.228 One scenario
where the purchase price reduction doctrine might not apply is for full
scholarships, where the student pays nothing to the educational
institution. Arguably this is still a bargain purchase (with a purchase price
of zero), but the relevant authorities generally involve taxpayers who are
otherwise paying something in the transaction.
Finally, even if scholarships are not nontaxable purchase price
adjustments, and should be considered part of the tax base, Congress has
chosen as a policy matter to exclude them from income as a tax
expenditure. The exclusion under Code section 117 is part of a larger tax
preference scheme intended to promote higher education, which also
includes tax preferences for educational savings accounts, tax credits for
attending higher educational institutions, and charitable deductions for
contributions to donations to educational institutions.229
On a basic level, one could describe a scholarship as a free benefit
provided to people to encourage them to engage in desirable behavior—
attending college. When viewed this way, scholarships look a lot like
nudges or BBS. (They also likely function as true economic subsidies.) If
224
The value of the educational benefit likely exceeds the cost of tuition because higher
educational institutions receive substantial funding from other sources besides tuition,
including government subsidies. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 222, at 71.
225
See generally sources cited at note 222 (observing the difficulty of assessing educational
value as justification for exempting academic scholarships from taxable income under the
federal tax code).
226
See supra note 221; see also Dodge, supra note 222, at 701–02.
227
See Dodge, supra note 222, at 711.
228
See Freedom Newspapers v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1755, 1758–59 (1977).
229
JCT Tax Expenditures, supra note 207, at 27–28.
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scholarships are tax-exempt because we want to encourage people to
attend college, one could argue that nudges should be exempt for the very
same reason.
For incentive-based nudges that provide taxpayers with goods,
services, or cash that must be spent on a designated purchase, the
scholarship analogy provides strong support for non-taxation. Consider
again the case of earthquake retrofit grants. Unlike a true cash gift, which
would provide money with no strings attached, a retrofit grant must be
applied towards the specified work on the home. (It may also be a
reimbursement for such work.) The recipient receives a valuable benefit,
but the benefit is necessarily converted into the desired outcome—in this
case, a safer house. Such is also the case with tax-free tuition scholarships,
which do not provide disposable funds but, rather, provide money solely
to pay for education (and related expenses). The provision of free light
bulbs, or cash to upgrade to energy-efficient appliances, also provides
benefits that must be applied to produce desired outcomes.230
The same is not true of all cash-based nudges, however. Some such
incentives pay taxpayers after they have engaged in desired behavior, and
provide taxpayers with no-strings-attached funds. An example would be
paying someone cash to quit smoking. Arguably this looks more like
compensation and less like a scholarship.
In sum, many incentive-based nudges and BBS resemble tuition
scholarships, which have a long and well-accepted history of exclusion
from income tax. In cases like grants to mitigate future damage from
natural disasters or to purchase energy-efficient property, the funds are
directed at achieving a specific, desired policy goal. Although the
taxpayer has experienced an economic accession to wealth, excluding the
benefit from tax serves to promote that goal. Further, the benefit is
distinguishable from unrestricted cash grants. Although this analogy is

230

Because retrofit grants and similar payments must be applied towards the specified
property improvements, they are better viewed as the provision of property, rather than as a
receipt of cash by the taxpayer. There is precedent for this approach, although it is not the
approach the IRS has taken specifically with retrofit grants. For example, in Bailey v.
Commissioner, the taxpayer wasn’t taxed on an urban renewal grant for his property because
the grant went directly to the general contractor, and the court found the taxpayer never had
sufficient control over the funds to warrant taxation. See 88 T.C. 1293, 1301 (1987), acq.,
1989-2 C.B. 1.
Arguably, any time an individual receives an incentive-based nudge or BBS in the form of
cash that must be spent on specified property or services, the taxability of such funds should
be based on the ultimate purchase, rather than on the temporary receipt of cash.
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persuasive for many nudges, it does not support non-taxation of cash
compensation in other contexts, such as achieving health goals.
4. Bottom Line: Which Nudges Should Be Taxable?
Recall that, as a default matter, the Code taxes all income regardless of
source. If the ideal tax base includes all economic income, the payer of
such income should not be relevant to the determination of taxability.
In reality, the Code does not tax all income and makes a number of
deviations from the economic definition. Many of those deviations can be
justified based on administrability, such as the fact that the Code taxes
only realized gains, rather than unrealized accessions in wealth.231 With
the exception of gifts, which some have argued are rightfully excluded
from the tax base, the payer is generally not relevant to determining which
items should be excluded from the tax base.
Other deviations are rightly considered tax expenditures, meaning they
are simply policy choices made by Congress to give preferential treatment
in certain circumstances. In those cases, the payer is sometimes relevant.
For example, fringe benefits are excluded when paid by an employer, but
similar payments made outside of the employment scenario may not be
exempt. Similarly, interest on bonds paid by private issuers is taxable,
whereas interest on bonds paid by state and local governments is
exempted by Code section 103. However, most tax expenditures are
accompanied by some identifiable policy justification for the special
treatment.232 For example, the exclusion of interest on state and local
bonds acts as a subsidy to state and local government programs that are
funded by such bonds.233
In the case of taxable nudges and BBS, the payer is the single most
important factor in determining taxability. However, the policy reason for
this is not always clear. Whereas specific tax expenditures may exempt
231

For example, if a taxpayer owns an asset that appreciates in value (e.g., a stock or a
house), she has a positive change in net wealth. However, the Code will not tax her until she
“realize[s]” a gain, such as by making a sale. See I.R.C. § 1001.
232
For a discussion of the legislative history behind the section 132 fringe benefit rules, see
infra notes 261–67 and accompanying text.
233
See Scott Greenberg, Reexamining the Tax Exemption of Municipal Bond Interest, Tax
Found. Fiscal Fact No. 520 (July 2016), https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/
docs/TaxFoundation_FF520.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZY7A-QS3M]. (observing that state and
local bonds are justified as a basis for incentivizing investments in projects that benefit
nonresidents, but concluding that “[a] tax exclusion is an unideal policy design for subsidizing
state and local debt”).
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income in order to achieve policy goals set by Congress, the rules
governing taxability of nudges and BBS are an ad hoc assortment that has
evolved over time. In some cases, there is no obvious policy reason for
varying the treatment based on the payer when two payments might have
an identical policy goal. A payment to mitigate the harm of drug addiction
from the government might be taxable, whereas an economically identical
payment from a nonprofit might be tax-free. A payment to mitigate
earthquake damage made by an insurance company is likely an
excludable purchase price adjustment, but an identical government
payment is taxable.
As discussed further below, there is no good justification for taxing
government nudges when similar payments from private parties are taxexempt. Accordingly, Section III.C proposes reforms that would exclude
many such government nudges from income.
Other than government payments, the other taxable category of nudges
is payments from employers that do not otherwise qualify as fringe
benefits, or for another exclusion. In this case, taxability makes sense and
major reform is not necessary. Congress has legislated broad exclusions
in the area of employment that cover many types of payments, particularly
if they relate to business, health insurance, or medical care. These
exclusions cover most of the nudges discussed here. Payments that occur
outside of those settings are presumptively compensation, which is a fair
assumption. Employers generally do not make payments out of generosity
or even moral duty; rather, they make payments to employees for business
reasons. If a particular nudge from an employer were not excluded and
Congress desired otherwise, it would make more sense to legislate an
incremental reform to a statute like section 132, as opposed to enacting a
statute aimed at nudges. For example, if Congress deemed a particular
wellness plan benefit to be good policy, and wanted to exclude it from
income, lawmakers might add the benefit to the list of excluded fringes
under section 132.
To summarize the current state of the tax law, it is useful to separate
nudges (and BBS) into categories based on the payer. Incentives provided
by employers are generally tax-exempt as long as they qualify as a fringe
benefit or medical expense. Incentives provided by private third parties
like insurance or utility companies are generally excluded under the
purchase price doctrine. Incentives provided by charitable nonprofits are
generally excluded as gifts. The outlier is incentives provided by the
government. While payments based on economic need or to disaster
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victims are exempt under the general welfare doctrine, most other
government incentive payments are taxable. As will be discussed further
below, the policy justification for these differing treatments is unclear.
The tax treatment of the various types of nudges is summarized in the
table below.
Table 1: Tax Nudges Provided by Various Actors
Payer

Tax Treatment

Examples

Employer

Tax-free if medical care,
health insurance, or a
defined fringe benefit

Wellness program
benefits like health
screenings, token gifts

Taxable Compensation

Any cash prize

Utility Company

Tax-free purchase price
adjustment

Free lightbulbs, rebates
for home improvements

Insurance Company

Tax-free purchase price
adjustment

Nonprofit/Charity

Tax-free gift
Tax-free if need-based

Government

Taxable if not needbased

Rebates or discounts for
achieving health goals
Red Cross disaster aid
Disaster relief grant
Disaster mitigation grant

B. What’s Wrong with Taxing Nudges?
Before turning to the policy implications of the above-described tax
regime, it is useful to consider the consequences. Does it matter if we tax
nudges? Imposing income tax on an incentive lessens its value, but one
response would be to gross-up the amount of the incentive. For example,
if a government wanted to offer a $1,000 subsidy but a tax of 20% (or
$200) would be owed, the government could instead make the subsidy
$1,250.234 Although this results in a circular flow of funds in the case of
234

In that case, 20% or $250 would be tax, and $1,000 would remain.
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a federal subsidy,235 it is not necessarily so in the case of federal tax on a
state or local incentive. Regardless, from a purely economic perspective,
the cost of taxing nudges can be accounted for by increasing the incentive.
This Article, however, is concerned with the noneconomic cost of
taxing nudges and BBS. The very premise of these payments is that
sometimes noneconomic incentives can encourage desired behavior. It is
a logical corollary that noneconomic costs may similarly deter desired
behavior. If taxing incentive-based nudges imposes a friction that deters
people from wanting to accept those incentives, then taxing nudges will
be counterproductive. In other words, the cost of taxing nudges may be
more than the economic cost of the tax itself.
1. Tax as a Friction to Nudges
To date, no studies have specifically examined the cost of imposing tax
on nudges or BBS. However, some inferences can be drawn from related
studies. Accordingly, this Subsection examines attitudes towards taxes
and how various “frictions” other than tax influence peoples’ take up of
benefits. The key inference from this literature is that taxes may
discourage people from wanting to accept incentive-based nudges and
BBS. If they avoid the nudge to avoid the tax, then policymakers’ goals
in implementing the nudge will be thwarted.
a. Tax Aversion
Many people strongly dislike taxes. The phenomenon is often
described as “tax aversion,” which can be thought of as the psychological
cost imposed by taxes beyond their financial cost.236 Researchers have
observed tax aversion in studies showing that people overweight the cost
of a tax when making financial decisions, treat tax costs differently than

235

If the federal government increases a federal subsidy from $1,000 to $1,250 to account
for federal income tax, it will pay $250 more for the subsidy and collect $250 in tax.
236
See, e.g., Christopher C. Fennell & Lee Ann Fennell, Fear and Greed in Tax Policy: A
Qualitative Research Agenda, 13 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 75, 79 (2003) (“A functional
definition of . . . tax aversion . . . is the amount by which one’s aversion to a tax exceeds the
economic cost of the tax.”); Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12
Psych., Pub. Pol’y & Law 106, 117 (2006); Abigail B. Sussman & Christopher Y. Olivola,
Axe the Tax: Taxes Are Disliked More than Equivalent Costs, 68 J. Mktg. Rsch. S91, S91
(2011).
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other costs,237 and behave differently depending on whether a fee is
labeled as a “tax” or not.238 Tax aversion may explain real world scenarios
like the enormous popularity of sales tax holidays at retail establishments
or the overinvestment in tax-exempt bonds by individuals for whom the
economic return is unfavorable.239
For example, in one experiment, participants were presented with the
hypothetical option of investing money in either a riskless savings
account that earned $75 per year, or a risky bond that earned $120 per
year.240 Some participants were told the bond was tax-exempt and yielded
$120 of interest.241 Others were told the bond was taxable, yielded $160
of interest, but would yield an after-tax return of $120.242 In other words,
the economics of the tax-exempt bond and the taxable bond were
identical.
Although the financial return on the two bonds was the same, people
were far more likely to choose the bond over the savings account in the
tax-exempt scenario (88%) compared to the taxable scenario (18%).243
Similarly, another experiment compared a simple investment choice
between a taxable bond with a $300 after-tax yield to a tax-exempt bond
with a $300 yield, and the majority of subjects (77%) favored the taxexempt bond.244
In yet another experiment, subjects were asked how much of a discount
they would require to wait in line at a store for 15 minutes to purchase a
jacket.245 When the discount was framed as a “customer rewards” sale,
participants demanded a higher percentage discount. But they were
willing to accept a lower percentage discount to wait in line when that
237

See, e.g., Sussman & Olivola, supra note 236, at S93 (describing experiments that found
people change their behavior to avoid taxes, but not reacting in a similar manner to comparable
non-tax costs).
238
McCaffery & Baron, supra note 236, at 117–18 (recounting an experiment the authors
conducted where individuals were confronted with a policy labeled as a tax or comparable
economic policy not labeled as a tax, which “found that labels mattered”); David J. Hardisty,
Eric J. Johnson & Elke U. Weber, A Dirty Word or a Dirty World? Attribute Framing, Political
Affiliation, and Query Theory, 21 Psych. Sci. 86, 91 (2010) (finding in an experiment that
“framing the cost increase as a tax differentially affected the structure and content of thoughts
generated by Democrats and Republicans, leading to different preferences”).
239
Sussman & Oliviola, supra note 236, at S94–96, S100.
240
Id. at S95.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id.
244
Id. at S95–96.
245
Id. at S94.
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discount was described as an “axe-the-tax” sale that would allow for a
tax-free purchase.
These and other studies indicate that, for many people,246 the presence
of a tax distorts rational cost-benefit analysis. This has important
implications for financial incentives designed to encourage certain
behaviors. Although they may be constrained by budgets, policymakers
or researchers may set incentive amounts based on what they determine
is an optimal amount. For example, a local government may decide $500
is too small of a grant to encourage people to retrofit their homes to protect
against earthquakes, but that $1,000 is the “right” amount.
If the grant were subject to tax at a rate of 20%, policymakers might
raise the amount (i.e., gross up) to $1,250 so that the after-tax grant is still
$1,000. However, as in the above-described experiments, tax aversion
may lead people to value a taxable grant at something less than the aftertax amount. For example, an individual might view a taxable grant that is
worth $1,000 after-tax to be equivalent to only an $800 payment in their
mind. In that case, they may choose not to accept the grant and make the
desired improvements.
Put more simply, tax aversion may reduce the effectiveness of financial
incentives because people do not like to pay tax. Individuals may be
willing to forego incentives that are in their economic interest out of a
desire to avoid the tax.247 And although some studies indicate that taxaversion bias may wear off over time with experience, nudges and BBS
are more likely to be one time or infrequent incentives, which are much
more susceptible to tax aversion.248

246

One source of variation appears to be political affiliation. Studies show that Republicans
and Independents are sensitive to “tax” labels in decision making, but Democrats generally
are not. See id. at S96–97; Hardisty et al., supra note 238, at 91 (finding “that the power of a
framing manipulation can depend on participants’ preexisting individual differences”).
247
Of course, tax aversion will not deter participants who are unaware of the tax, which may
be the case when there is no information reporting required. For incentives subject to
information reporting (discussed more below), participants will likely have to provide tax
information at the outset (e.g., a Form W-9), and are more likely to be aware of tax
consequences. Other programs may disclose tax consequences on their website or in related
materials, as is the case with California’s Earthquake Mitigation program. See infra note 272.
248
See generally Kay Blaufus & Axel Möhlmann, Security Returns and Tax Aversion Bias:
Behavioral Responses to Tax Labels, 15 J. Behav. Fin. 56, 63–65 (2014) (finding that people
have tax aversion bias toward infrequent, unfamiliar financial decisions).
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b. Tax Avoidance
Another reason people might be less inclined to respond to taxable
financial incentives is because they do not want to have any income
reported to the IRS. These concerns are not unfounded, since many
nudges and BBS will be reported to the government by the payer.
Generally, miscellaneous payments to non-employees of $600 or more
must be reported on a Form 1099-MISC, which gets sent to both the
taxpayer and the IRS.249 For example, the IRS has ruled that earthquake
retrofit grants are subject to this information reporting.250
This information reporting on its own, independent of tax aversion,
may deter some people from accepting such grants. For people who
currently do not file tax returns, work in cash-businesses, underreport
their income, or otherwise take part in the underground economy, they
may view the receipt of a 1099 as a red flag for the government that they
would like to avoid.
c. Complexity and Benefits Take Up
Another reason that taxing financial incentives may deter taxpayers is
complexity and the hassle of dealing with the tax obligation. This is
separate from disdain for paying taxes in general and from the desire to
avoid tax information reporting. Some people may be willing to report
and pay the tax in theory, but simply not want to have to deal with the
trouble of doing so. If the perceived hassle cost is high enough, people
may turn down taxable incentives even when those incentives are
economically attractive.
What researchers call “hassle factors” have been shown to inhibit
desirable behavior such as undergoing medical screenings or applying for
food stamps.251 As commentators have described, “[w]hereas hassle costs
may appear to a classical economist as too minor to be taken seriously,
such hassles are likely to be especially detrimental in the context of
program take-up.”252

249

See I.R.C. § 6041(a).
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201816004 (Apr. 20, 2018); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201815005 (Apr.
13, 2018).
251
Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan, & Eldar Shafir, Behavioral Economics and
Marketing in Aid of Decision Making Among the Poor, 25 J. Pub. Pol’y & Mktg. 8, 16 (2006).
252
Id.
250
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For example, one study examined the role of “psychological frictions”
in the failure of eligible recipients to claim the Earned Income Tax
Credit.253 Researchers found that providing eligible claimants with
simplified information and forms in a second reminder notice increased
take-up.254 This led them to conclude that “confusion, program
complexity, and lack of program awareness play a significant role in the
failure to take-up, while stigma, and high perceived economic costs of
claiming, do not.”255
Taxing nudges may present an analogous impediment to their efficacy.
Many individuals find the tax system daunting and confusing,256 and
concerns over how to report taxable payments, or having to come up with
liquid funds to pay the tax on reported payments, may discourage takeup. This is further exacerbated by the fact that taxable nudges and BBS
are subject to information reporting but not to withholding (other than
incentives paid by employers).257 In the absence of withholding, taxpayers
will have to budget for the taxes owed and potentially make a payment
with their return, an unappealing prospect for many people.258
d. Payer Reporting Obligations
Another downside of taxing nudges is that the payer, i.e., the entity
offering the incentive, may be deterred from offering the incentive if it
comes with tax reporting obligations. As discussed above, payers
generally have an obligation to issue a 1099 for payments of $600 or
more.259 Failure to do so may result in penalties.260 For the same reasons

253

Saurabh Bhargava & Dayanand Manoli, Psychological Frictions and the Incomplete
Take-Up of Social Benefits: Evidence from an IRS Field Experiment, 105 Am. Econ. Rev.
3489, 3490 (2015).
254
Id. at 3524.
255
Id. at 3492.
256
See Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, User-Friendly Taxpaying, 92 Ind. L.J. 1509, 1512
(2017).
257
Tax withholding is required on payments of employee compensation, but not for other
payments. See I.R.C. § 3402(a).
258
See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 94, at 84.
259
See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
260
Penalties are up to $270 per information return (up to $550 in the case of intentional
disregard) and may be assessed separately for both failure to issue to the payee and failure to
file with the IRS. For a summary of these penalties, see Increase in Information Return
Penalties, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/government-entities/federal-state-local-governments/
increase-in-information-return-penalties [https://perma.cc/F2NZ-K4CL] (last visited July 17,
2019).
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that recipients might be deterred by taxes on incentives, payers may also
be deterred. For example, they may be reluctant to attract IRS scrutiny,
fear penalties if they misunderstand reporting requirements, or want to
avoid the hassle or additional economic cost of having to undertake
information reporting.
2. Uncertainty
As discussed in the preceding section, taxing nudges may counteract
the effectiveness of the nudge for a number of reasons, including deterring
both the intended recipient and the payer. Even putting aside those serious
concerns, taxing nudges creates problematic uncertainty in the tax law.
There are several reasons why taxing nudges creates uncertainty. It is
likely surprising and counterintuitive to many people that government
grants would be taxed. Having a surprise tax obligation, in turn, may
encourage negative views about the tax system, and may also lead to
unintentional noncompliance. For example, a person may get a 1099 at
the end of the year showing taxable income and be unable to afford the
tax because they did not budget properly in advance.
Furthermore, varying the tax treatment of incentives based on the payer
is likely confusing, and makes the law harder to predict and understand.
As discussed above, a grant from a charity may be a tax-free gift while an
economically identical grant from a city may be taxable.
One response to this uncertainty is as follows: Taxable nudges often go
unreported, and the IRS is unlikely to find out or enforce penalties in this
area. So, one might ask, what is the harm? But even if parties are keeping
nudges off the IRS’s radar, or if a resource-constrained IRS simply looks
the other way, widespread non-reporting is harmful to the tax system as a
whole. This is true notwithstanding that relatively low amounts of
revenue may be at stake. Congress recognized this potential harm decades
ago in the somewhat analogous context of employer fringe benefits.
Before code section 132 was enacted in 1984,261 there was widespread
noncompliance when it came to noncash compensation from employers.
Many employers provided such benefits and did not report them, and the
IRS had informally blessed these arrangements through a combination of

261
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 499 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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non-enforcement and private rulings.262 Yet notwithstanding the IRS’s
complacence, Congress decided to take action. In creating a specific
statutory exclusion for certain fringe benefits, the legislative history to
section 132 cites several justifications.
First, Congress recognized that employers often have a genuine
business purpose, apart from compensation, to offer fringe benefits,
which justifies exclusion even though the employee receives an economic
benefit.263 Second, Congress recognized that the lack of clarity and
selective enforcement around fringe benefits resulted in “inequities,
confusion, and administrative difficulties” for both taxpayers and the IRS,
which Congress deemed “unacceptable.”264 Third, Congress recognized
that failing to set well-defined limits would result in too many untaxed
fringe benefits and erode the tax base.265 Finally, Congress noted that
“unrestrained expansion of noncash compensation” would result in
inequities, because employees in certain lines of business would have
access to untaxed compensation and others would not.266 In sum,
Congress decided that codifying what was already a widespread practice
of non-reporting fringe benefits “substantially improves the equity and
administration of the tax system.”267
Much of the logic behind the enactment of section 132 applies in the
case of nudges, as well. Like fringe benefits, nudges are often offered for
a non-compensatory purpose, making them distinguishable from
traditional, taxable forms of payment. Further, non-reporting of nudges
by some is bound to result in inequity and confusion. Even if many
taxpayers are not reporting nudges in practice, a clearly defined system of
exclusions would result in a more equitable and administrable tax system.
3. Implications for the Efficacy of Nudges and BBS
Many taxpayers are likely unaware that incentive-based nudges are
taxable. If taxing nudges does not line up with peoples’ intuitions about
what kind of income is taxable, there is more likely to be resentment and
other negative responses to such taxes, as well as potential
262

See Staff of J. Comm. on Tax’n, 98th Cong., General Explanation of the Revenue
Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, at 840 (Comm. Print 1984).
263
Id.
264
Id. at 841.
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
Id. at 843.
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noncompliance. Furthermore, as discussed above, even setting aside
taxpayer confusion and noncompliance, a tax obligation might deter
taxpayers from taking up incentives altogether. Whereas a nudge is meant
to reduce psychological frictions that prevent people from making
desirable choices, taxing nudges may simply introduce a new friction.
Several implications flow from these observations. First, further study
is needed regarding how taxing nudges may influence behavior,
particularly the take up of incentive-based nudges and BBS. While
researchers have specifically examined other psychological frictions to
benefit take up, to date, tax itself has not been studied as a source of
friction. For example, if participants in a study are willing to quit smoking
in exchange for cash payments, what would be the impact of also telling
those participants the payments will be taxed? Would participants
demand a higher incentive or, instead, no longer want to participate?
Researchers have largely overlooked this potential friction. And while tax
aversion is a well-documented phenomenon, it would be useful to study
whether people are more or less susceptible to it in the context of nudges.
Further, policymakers may want to consider tax consequences in their
design of nudges or BBS. If an incentive is taxable and another alternative
is not, the non-taxable nudge may be a better choice for influencing
behavior. On the other hand, to the extent a certain incentive is not taxable
(for example, because it is excluded under a specific Code provision),
promoting it as “tax free” may make it more attractive given what we
know about tax aversion. Finally, policymakers might consider taxation
in deciding whether to choose a “nudge” at all as opposed to a traditional
incentive. It may turn out, for example, that a penalty on undesirable
behavior may be more effective than an incentive that will be taxed.
C. Potential Reforms
Given that the current tax regime for nudges is confusing and
somewhat arbitrary, and given that taxing nudges may counteract their
effectiveness,268 reforms may be in order. This section discusses potential
options for reform that range from modest proposals to more fundamental
changes to the Tax Code.

268

Equally important, but beyond this Article’s scope, are potential federalism and comity
concerns that may arise when the federal government seeks to tax state programs, to the extent
the tax hinders the state’s ability to implement the program.
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One reform has already been proposed, although its scope is narrow.
In the case of earthquake mitigation payments, which the IRS has ruled
are taxable, members of Congress from California have proposed federal
legislation that would exempt such payments from tax.269 Specifically, the
bill proposes amending Code section 139 to add a paragraph that would
exclude “qualified earthquake mitigation payment[s],” which include
grants, credits, or loans paid pursuant to an earthquake loss mitigation
program established by a state.270 In promoting the bill, Senator Dianne
Feinstein stated: “Our bill makes sure Californians aren't taxed for
participating in lifesaving earthquake preparation programs, like the
Earthquake Brace + Bolt program . . . . We must do all we can to
encourage earthquake-readiness and this bill will make it easier for
Californians to take the necessary steps to protect their families.”271 The
proposed exclusion is sensible. Not taxing the mitigation grants will make
the grants more attractive, which in turn may make Californians more
likely to undertake measures to improve their homes.272
However, the California lawmakers’ proposal covers only one narrow
incentive—earthquake mitigation grants—and leaves untouched the tax
treatment of other programs that may have a similar focus and face the
same tax treatment. While the intent behind the proposal is laudable, a
broader approach would be better than a piecemeal approach. Broader
reforms would impact more taxpayers and, ideally, be able to address
future incentive-based programs as they arise.
1. Taxing Government Grants: Change the Default
As discussed above, many nudges and BBS are excluded from income
under the Code as long as the payer is someone other than the
269
See Earthquake Mitigation Incentive and Tax Parity Act of 2017, H.R. 1691, 115th Cong.
(2017); Earthquake Mitigation Incentive and Tax Parity Act of 2017, S. 2104, 115th Cong.
(2017).
270
Id.
271
Press Release, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Feinstein and Harris Introduce Legislation to
Protect Earthquake Loss Mitigation Incentive Ahead of Senate GOP Tax Bill Release (Nov.
9, 2017), https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ContentRecord_
id=78BD9E69-4090-4E62-AE1A-08A01870F3AB [https://perma.cc/L7UZ-BY8G].
272
The Brace + Bolt program mentions potential consequences in an FAQ on its website,
stating, “The homeowner of a retrofit House under the Program will receive an IRS Form
1099, if applicable, reporting the amount of incentive payments as taxable income to the
homeowner for federal income tax purposes.” See Earthquake Brace+Bolt FAQs,
https://www.earthquakebracebolt.com/FAQ [https://perma.cc/GXF5-HMEU] (last visited
July 24, 2019).
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government. Employer benefits are often excluded as fringe benefits
under section 132, payments from nonprofits will often be treated as gifts,
and payments in the commercial context will generally be treated as
purchase price adjustments. The biggest shortcoming of the current tax
regime for nudges and BBS is that payments from a government are
taxable under the Code, even when they may be economically
indistinguishable from similar payments from a private party.
Furthermore, government grants are often taxable, while an economically
identical tax credit may not be.273 In many cases, this result is nonsensical
and, as discussed above, the tax on a grant may counteract its
effectiveness. In some cases, the very reason for offering a grant versus a
tax credit may be that the grant appeals to peoples’ behavioral
preferences.
Under current law, government transfers are taxable as a default matter
(like any other income),274 yet the Code and IRS administrative rulings
are full of exceptions. In fact, exceptions to the default taxability of
government transfers are so widespread that they nearly swallow the rule.
This prevalence likely contributes to confusion and widely held beliefs
that government payments are not taxable.
A wholesale move to exclude all government transfers from income is
not viable, nor is it sensible. Some government transfers are rightly treated
as income. For example, unemployment insurance payments are taxed as
income,275 which is the right result, because they are a substitute for wages
one would earn from working.276 Similarly, salary paid to government
employees should clearly be taxable compensation, just as wages from a
third party would be. Further, while Social Security retirement benefits
are excluded from income for many taxpayers, requiring income
exclusion for taxpayers over a certain income threshold has the effect of
imposing higher marginal tax rates on those earners.277 Commentators
273
Although state tax credits are generally not taxable, to the extent they reduce a taxpayer’s
state tax liability, the refundable portion (if any) of a state tax credit is taxable. See, e.g.,
Ginsburg v. United States, 922 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (holding that the refundable
portion of a New York State tax credit was includible in income for federal income tax
purposes).
274
See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
275
I.R.C. § 85. However, prior to the enactment of section 85, the IRS treated
unemployment payments as excludable. See Rev. Rul. 70-280, 1970-1 C.B. 13.
276
Failing to tax unemployment compensation also favors such compensation over wages,
which may distort decisions to work.
277
See I.R.C. § 86. Previously, the IRS treated all Social Security benefits as exempt from
tax. See Rev. Rul. 70-217, 1970-1 C.B. 13.
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have also noted that retirement benefits should be taxed because, like
unemployment payments, they are substitutes for wages.278
So how could policymakers create a broad, generalized rule that would
exclude nudges and BBS while continuing to tax government transfers
that should be taxable? The more traditional approach would be to carve
out the desired payments and pass legislation excluding them from
income. However, a significant drawback to this approach is that it
requires either a narrow scope (as in the case of the earthquake mitigation
payment proposal) or requires creating a broad definition of excludable
nudges. The latter approach, discussed further below, has its own
challenges. How would one define “nudge,” and decide which should be
taxable and which should be excluded? How would one write a statute
that would adequately capture future behavioral interventions that do not
yet exist but would warrant exclusion from the tax base?
But there is another approach to reform that avoids these obstacles.
Policymakers could simply shift the default approach to taxing
government transfers—from taxable to not taxable. In other words,
government transfers would be excluded from income for federal income
tax purposes unless specifically included by the Code.279
For nudges and BBS paid by governments, this creates an ideal rule,
which is a default of non-taxability. If policymakers determine that a
specific behavioral intervention should have tax consequences, they could
legislate an inclusion rule. But in the absence of a reason to tax nudges,
they would remain tax-free. The approach itself acts as a nudge for
lawmakers, requiring active departure from a desired default.
A default exclusion rule for government transfers would require only
minor adjustments to the Tax Code because the taxability of many
government transfers is already codified notwithstanding the default
inclusion rule of section 61. For example, unemployment compensation
would continue to be taxable per Code section 85, as would certain Social
Security retirement benefits per section 86. In those cases, no
amendments to the Code would be needed. Nor would Congress have to
repeal Code sections that exclude certain government transfers from
income, though it would be logical to do so. While such exclusions would
278

See, e.g., Forman, supra note 204, at 795. But see Brian Galle, How to Save
Unemployment Insurance, 50 Ariz. St. L.J. 1009, 1062–64 (2018) (arguing for repeal of taxes
on unemployment benefits).
279
Professor Charlotte Crane has observed that this appears to have been the IRS’s historical
approach prior to the evolution of the general welfare doctrine. Crane, supra note 217, at 594.
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be redundant under a broad change in the default rule, the tax treatment
of those exclusions would remain the same.280
For other taxable government transfers that are not specifically
included in income via statute, a relatively simple statute could include
them. For example, Congress might enact legislation providing first in
paragraph (a) that all transfers from a government entity are excluded
from taxation unless otherwise provided in the Code. The legislation
could then have a second paragraph, (b), providing that paragraph (a) does
not apply to the following payments, with a list of exceptions.
For example, any payment that is compensation for services should be
on the list of exceptions in the statute (i.e., treated as income). Although
providing a list of exceptions to the default rule may, at first, appear to
undercut the simplicity of this approach, the list of exceptions is likely
shorter and simpler than the reverse approach. In other words, so many
government transfers are excluded from income already that it is easier to
make exclusion the default and list the inclusions.
Shifting the default for government transfers will not change the
current treatment of most transfers. Social welfare benefits like TANF
will continue to be excluded, as will many Social Security benefits. The
new rule would, however, obviate the general welfare doctrine. Recall
that the administratively created rule required a showing of “need” to treat
a government transfer as exempt.
With a default exclusion rule, there would no longer need to be a
demonstration of economic need or hardship from disaster. This is a
preferable approach. Compensating victims of disaster and providing
benefits to needy individuals is an appropriate government policy. But
providing incentives that help prevent these scenarios—for example by
keeping people healthy and free of medical expenses or by making
peoples’ homes safe—is an equally worthy goal. What’s more, the latter
approach is often more cost effective and may prevent future loss. There
is no justifiable reason to exempt payments, from tax, that clean up a mess
and not exempt payments designed to prevent a mess from happening in
the first place. Accordingly, the effective replacement of the general
welfare doctrine with a broader exclusion would improve the tax system.
280

Examples include current exclusions for educational grants, veterans’ benefits, and
worker’s compensation payments. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 104(a)(1) (worker’s comp), I.R.C. § 117
(scholarships), 38 U.S.C. § 5301 (veterans’ benefits). Similarly, Medicare benefits, which are
not specifically excluded by statute but are treated as such by the IRS, would continue to be
excluded. See Rev. Rul. 70-341, 1970-2 C.B. 31–32.
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Perhaps the biggest upside of this approach is it accounts for future
interventions that have yet to be implemented. As discussed in Part I, the
use of nudges and BBS by governments has grown considerably in the
last decade. Further, policy priorities inevitably shift over time.
Investment in energy efficient appliances and other technologies is a
focus in 2020 but was not fifty years ago. As policymakers find new ways
to incentivize behavior that is productive to health, the environment, or
other contexts, a default exclusion statute ensures that tax will not create
an impediment. And if, after careful deliberation, Congress determines
that taxing a particular government program is appropriate, they will be
able to do so.
2. Targeted Legislation
Creating a broad, default exclusion for government transfers would
effectively repeal a long-standing IRS rule (i.e., the general welfare
doctrine) that requires a showing of need to exempt government transfers.
Furthermore, if the exceptions in the statute were drafted too narrowly,
government transfers that should be taxable may inadvertently end up
being exempt by default, and Congress may act slowly to resolve the
problem. If enacting a broad default statute were deemed to be
undesirable for these reasons, a narrower approach would be to instead
enact a statute that specifically excludes certain nudges and BBS from
income. The goal would be to write a statute that only touches upon
nudges and BBS that are rightly excluded from income, but yet is written
as broadly as possible.
Most of the incentive-based nudges and BBS discussed in Part I can be
grouped broadly into the categories of health and the environment. Here,
“environment” encompasses both prevention of natural disasters like
earthquakes and a focus on green initiatives that encourage reliance on
cleaner and more efficient energy sources. With this in mind, lawmakers
could draft a statute that broadly excludes nudges and BBS in these two
areas.
For example, a new statute might provide that “Gross income does
include any ‘qualified public policy subsidy.’” “Qualified public policy
subsidy” could then be defined by the statute as: “any payment or other
incentive provided pursuant to a federal, state, or local government
program to promote health or to protect the environment.” The statute
could further define the concepts of “health” and “environment.”
However, the statute should be drafted broadly with authority granted to
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Treasury to draft regulations regarding specific programs or fact
situations. This would allow for the most flexibility and ability to update
the rules.
For example, the statute might specify that qualified public policy
subsidies include grants paid to mitigate or prevent damage to homes from
natural disasters, as well as subsidies paid to purchase energy efficient
products for the home. But Treasury regulations might specify which
natural disasters (e.g., floods, earthquakes) are contemplated by the
statute, as well as which types of energy efficient products are covered.
The same goes for health. The statute might cross-reference the Code’s
definition of “medical care”281 to define health, but regulations might
clarify that, for example, cash payments made as part of drug addiction
programs are exempt.
A “nudge tax” statute may be more politically palatable than a general
default statute for government transfers due to its narrower scope. It is
also less likely to have unintended consequences, such as inadvertently
excluding transfers from income that should clearly be taxable. But the
nudge statute comes with a significant drawback in that it may be underinclusive. Further, attempts to adequately define subsidies that relate to
health and the environment may lead to a complex and hard-to-read
statute.
What’s more, enacting a nudge tax statute makes it hard to account for
potential new categories of nudges and BBS. It is perfectly feasible that,
in ten years, an entirely new category of incentives wholly outside the
context of health and environment will emerge with strong justifications
for tax exemption. Yet, if not covered by the current Code, government
transfers will continue to be taxable as a default matter.
An analogous situation has occurred with section 132’s exclusion for
fringe benefits. Recall that, in enacting section 132 in the 1980s, Congress
attempted to carve out a list of fringes that should be excluded from
taxation, based on common practices at the time.282 Since its original
enactment, Congress has made few updates to section 132, yet fringe
benefits have evolved well beyond what its drafters could have possibly
contemplated over 30 years ago. For example, Silicon Valley companies
now frequently offer onsite lifestyle benefits like free meals, laundry, and
fitness classes that were unheard of in decades past.283 Work-provided
281

See supra note 167.
See supra notes 261–67 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 172.
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cellphones, a staple in the 21st century at many jobs, did not exist at the
time of the original statute.284 As a result, the tax treatment of these newer
benefits is uncertain, recreating the scenario that section 132 was designed
to avoid: the inequitable provision of tax-free benefits, sporadic informal
guidance, and confusion.285
One way to avoid this fate would be to delegate much of a nudge
statute’s scope to regulations, which is generally not the approach taken
by section 132.286 Regardless, there is a real risk that a nudge statute will
look outdated from a policy perspective several decades into the future.
One remaining issue regarding the scope of a nudge statute is whether
it should apply to government transfers only, or instead apply more
broadly. The statute could be drafted such that qualified public policy
subsidies were defined with respect to the nature of the program (health
or environmental) but without reference to the payer being a government.
The upside of this approach is that it would unify and simplify the tax
treatment of incentive-based nudges. Rather than a collection of various
statutes and doctrines applying—the purchase price adjustment doctrine
in some scenarios, the gift exclusion in others, or section 132’s exclusion
for fringe benefits—all transfers of a similar nature would be treated the
same, regardless of the payer.287
However, in some cases, there may be good reason to treat payments
differently based on the payer. Consider a program designed to provide
cash awards to help people adopt healthy lifestyles (e.g., exercise or
smoking cessation). When coming from a government, such an award
looks like a true nudge or BBS. But when coming from an employer, the
treatment is less certain. Employers may hope that such awards will help
them attract and retain talented employees, suggesting a compensatory
nature. One could argue that the statutory framework provided by sections
105, 106, and 132 already governs when employer benefits should be
excluded, and accordingly, a nudge statute should not cover employer
incentives.
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See Soled & Thomas, supra note 120, at 763–64, 776.
Id. at 814–15.
286
While section 132 contains a list of specific exclusions in the statute, section 132(o) does
delegate authority to Treasury to implement the statute and numerous regulations exist, such
as those clarifying what types of benefits qualify as de minimis fringes. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.132-6 (as amended in 1992).
287
Cf. Crane, supra note 217, at 612–13 (discussing the exclusion of transfer payments that
do not create new value, regardless of source).
285
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A reasonable compromise approach that responds to this argument
would be to extend the nudge statute beyond government transfers, but
specifically exclude transfers from employers. Since transfers from
charitable organizations are almost always excludable as gifts in this
context, and transfers from private parties (like utility companies or health
insurers) will generally be excluded under the purchase price doctrine, a
unified approach makes sense for these payers. Accordingly nudge tax
statute might exclude all health and environment related public policy
subsidies from income, while carving out only employer payments.
3. Require Withholding on Taxable Incentives
If neither a general default exclusion statute nor a nudge tax statute
were enacted, there are a few remaining possible scenarios. First,
Congress might do nothing, which will leave many government nudges
and BBS taxable. Second, Congress may enact a small number of
piecemeal reforms, like the proposed Earthquake Mitigation Incentive
and Tax Parity Act, which will have limited impact. There is one more
modest reform that lawmakers could enact, however, that would help
mitigate the problems created by taxing nudges and BBS. Specifically,
Congress could require tax withholding on these payments, so that
recipients do not have to make tax payments when they receive the
incentive.288
Because the current withholding rules only apply to payments from
employers, many nudges and BBS will not be subject to tax withholding.
This means the recipients may have surprising tax bills, which may create
negative perceptions about the relevant programs. For participants who
know they will owe taxes, concerns about budgeting for the tax or having
to deal with the payment may deter them from claiming the incentive.
Withholding tax from nudges and BBS could go a long way towards
overcoming some of the psychological frictions described in Section
III.B. Ample research suggests that withholding makes paying taxes less
painful for people, and if people receive only after-tax funds, they may
not view the tax payment as a loss at all.289 As I have advocated in earlier
work, policymakers could expand withholding rules to cover many types

288
Withholding could be set at a default rate (e.g., 5%), or taxpayers could fill out a form
that would determine their withholding rate. These possibilities are discussed in Thomas,
supra note 94, at 131–34.
289
See id. at 111.
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of payments outside of the employment context, including nudges and
BBS.290
CONCLUSION
Nudges present governments with a cost-effective way to promote
welfare in areas like health, environmental protection, and education.
Sometimes even a modest incentive can help people overcome present
bias or other irrational tendencies, and make better choices. But when
those incentives are taxable, they are inherently less attractive.
The current tax rules were simply not designed with nudges in mind.
As a result, government transfers that promote good policies, like
mitigating natural disaster harms, are subject to taxation. Confusingly,
similar transfers from private parties are not. Other examples will
continue to arise as governments expand their use of nudges and
behaviorally based subsidies.
Rather than trying to play catch-up with each new nudge, Congress
could enact a relatively simple and permanent fix: exempt government
transfers as a default matter and tax only specifically legislated inclusions.
Such a change would modernize the Tax Code to account for a new source
of income not contemplated by the original drafters. The rule would also
allow governments to innovate without the threat of taxation
counteracting new policies.
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Id. at 128.

